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The aim of this thesis is to provide the reader with some practical applications of 
quantitative techniques in the area of portfolio management. The theme of the thesis is on 
the use of basic quantitative applications, with an emphasis on issues pertaining to 
optimisation, benchmarking and risk management. 
Most of the contributions and analysis performed in this thesis has been borne out of 
actual applications in the financial market industry - thus the style of the thesis reflects an 
application level relevant to practitioners, and is not esoteric. A large element of the thesis 
consequently makes use of graphical aids in the discussions and dissemination of results. 
The level of presentation of the thesis is aimed at avoiding lengthy technical expositions in 
favour of an "easy-to-read" thesis. 
The thesis thus consists a collection of studies, some of which contain a common theme; 
others which remain unavoidable disjointed studies. 
A significant contribution in the thesis is on the demonstration of the innovative Black and 
Litterman (1991) technique of quantitative portfolio design based on managers' views in 
the local South African context. These views are incorporated into the optimisation-
process so that investment weights tilt away from a benchmark in an intuitive and practical 
way. 
The area of benchmarking is also reviewed, with specific emphasis on the selection and 
construction of benchmarks for various client requirements. Issues in portfolio risk 
management for active managers are considered, with the objective of setting risk 
mandates to avoid specified underperformance of active managers. In this chapter 
optimisation techniques are also used to estimate unknown holdings of competitor groups 
and simple graphical aids are highlighted to assist with interpreting benchmarking 
objectives. 
Lastly, two studies of multi-manager topics are reviewed, namely the impact of combining 












The thesis concludes with recommendations for asset managers to apply and adapt 
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Chapter 1: Background 
CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND 
1.1 Introduction 
One of the first and most important lessons of investments remains the trade-off between 
risk and return - as proposed by Markowitz (1952). Although these concepts had been 
intuitive amongst practitioners long before Markowitz (1952), the proposed theory sought 
to quantify portfolio characteristics (as a whole) in terms of mean and variance. When 
portfolios began to be judged against the index using these criteria, it turned out that only 
a handful of managers were able to "beat the index". An early school of thought led by a 
group of professors in the mid-1960s promoted the concept of investing in the market 
rather than actively managed funds, and herewith the concept of an underlying 
assumption market equilibrium. They concluded that the market index (as measured by a 
value-weighted index of all available assets) would be a mean-variance efficient portfolio, 
under the simplifying assumptions of CAPM1. 
Since the mid-1960's, much of Capital Market Theory was based on the premise that 
markets are efficient. Thus, academic literature frequently implied an underlying 
equilibrium assumption, favouring its application for passive fund managerment. As a 
consequence, there has been little in the way of direct guidance for active portfolio 
managers, since the theory of market equilibrium suggests that active management is 
futile. However, this says nothing about the potential for successful active portfolio 
management if dissequilibrium or inefficiencies occur. In fact, active management would 
always have a place in capital markets, since the extensive research of analysts to identify 
undervalued stocks is the primary reason for market efficiency. 
The theory of active portfolio management has thus emerged as an important building 
block in the study of portfolio theory. The increasing awareness of terms such as tracking 
error, information ratio and beta in the fund management industry is a clear indication of 
the popularity of active portfolio theory, as these basic concepts provide managers with 











Chapter 1: Background 
practical starting pOints for a framework which traditional modern portfolio theory could not 
offer. 
Empirical analyses are performed for certain sections where deemed necessary. 
However, where existing academic theory is deemed inadequate for the purposes of an 
empirical analysis, practical application of the theory is used, while attempting not to 
compromise statistical rig our. The aim of this thesis is to provide the reader with some 
practical applications of quantitative techniques in the area of active portfolio 
management. The theme of the thesis is predominantly quantitative, with an emphasis on 
issues pertaining to optimisation, benchmarking and risk management. 
1.2 Structure of thesis 
The thesis is partitioned into distinct chapters, where major areas of study in active 
portfolio theory is reviewed. The thesis thus consists a collection of studies, some of which 
contain a common theme, others that remain unavoidably disjointed studies - yet still fall 
within the common theme of quantitative portfolio theory. 
Chapter 2 reviews the groundwork of prior academic literature in the area of Modern 
Portfolio Theory (MPT), Capital Asset Pricing Models and the theory of Active Portfolio 
Management. 
Chapter 3 reviews the standard optimisation framework put forward by Markowitz (1952), 
and demonstrates an innovative practical refinement using the Black - Litterman 
methodology for adjusting return inputs. 
In Chapter 4, the broad area of benchmarking is reviewed, with specific emphasis on the 
practical application of selecting, constructing and estimating benchmarks in the South 
African context. 
Chapter 5 focuses on some of the important aspects of risk management for active 
managers, including expected tracking error, setting active risk mandates as well as 
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Chapter 6 considers two multi managers topics of interest, namely the effect of combining 
managers on active risk, as well as the persistence of fund performance in the South 
African Unit Trust Industry. 











Chapter 2: Literature Review 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, significant contributions to the areas of modern portfolio theory, the Capital 
Asset PriCing Model and theory relating to active portfolio theory will be discussed. This 
literature forms the groundwork for the areas of quantitative finance to be investigated in 
ensuing chapters. The contributions to the area of Modern Portfolio theory follows in 
section 2.1, with developments of the Capital Asset Pricing Model discussed in section 
2.2, followed by a brief outline of developments in the literature of active portfolio theory. 
2.1 Modern Portfolio Theory 
In the March 1952 edition of Journal of Finance, Harry Markowitz established a 
framework, which was heralded as a new paradigm in portfolio theory. This article 
represented one of the most significant movements towards a quantitative understanding 
of portfolio diversification, risk and return, and subsequently laid down the foundation for 
modern portfolio theory (MPT). A brief overview of this development as we" as related 
extensions in the area of MPT follow in the ensuing section, after which a more detailed 
emphasis is placed on the major practical areas of portfolio theory, namely the lessons of 
portfolio diversification, choosing optimal risky portfolios, and lastly the allocation amongst 
the bundle of risky assets and the risk- free asset. 
2.1.1 Overview 
When Markowitz began his work in the area of portfolio theory, he was a University of 
Chicago graduate looking for a dissertation topic. In his Ph.D., Markowitz argued that 
investors are mean - variance optimisers, i.e. looking for the highest expected return from 
their portfolios, yet at the same time wishing to reduce the portfolio risk. These two 
measures, of expected return and risk were deemed sufficient to serve as a starting point 
for developing a theory of portfolio construction. The underpinnings were based on 
premise that: given investors are rational and have the same expectations and time 
horizons, they will wish to hold portfolios that are efficient (highest return for the same 
level of risk). The important criterion of these efficient portfolios however is the trade-off 











Chapter 2: Literature Review 
(Sharpe Ratio), deemed the optimal. Thus, by exploring the risk-return relationship 
between assets, the benefits of a diversified portfolio can be attained and quantified. As a 
consequence, portfolio selection models based on mean-variance optimisation techniques 
were generated in order to select an optimal mix of risky assets, with further algorithms 
proposed by Wolfe (1959), Houthakker (1960) and Sharpe (1963). 
Tobin (1958) extended the work done by Markowitz through suggesting that the 
investment decision be broken up into two separate decisions. The first decision concerns 
the choice of optimal proportions of risky assets held which is independent of the 
individual's asset preferences. Tobin suggested the choice would naturally depend on the 
investors' expectations on each asset's return, risk and covariance with all other assets, 
yet assumed that expectations are homogenous across all investors. Thus, Tobin found 
that all investors would hold the same proportions of risky assets as their optimal portfolio 
of risky assets irrespective of the preferences. This optimal portfolio would by construction 
be the market portfoliO, i.e. the proportion market capitalisation of the asset in the market 
would be identical to the proportion in each investor's optimal portfolio. 
Given the investor is allowed to borrow (or lend) at the risk free rate, Tobin suggested that 
the second decision concerns the proportion of the market portfolio the investor holds and 
combines with cash. This decision is based on the individuals risk preference, giving the 
investor the ability to alter his portfolio risk simply by adjusting the proportion of cash he 
held on the portfolio. Thus, if investors were risk-averse, they would hold more cash. 
Conversely, if they were risk-taking, they would borrow at the risk-free rate (assuming the 
borrowing and lending rates were equal). However, regardless of the proportion held in 
cash, the bundle of risky assets held would remain proportional to the initial asset 
proportions of the risky portfolio. This separation of the investment decision is thus known 
as the separation theorem. 
However, it was only years later when anyone related the risk of assets to their price. 
Sharpe, another PhD candidate in search of a research topic, was working at the Rand 
Corporation, where Markowitz had taken up residence. Sharpe (1964) made the initial 
breakthrough in the theory of asset priCing, by proposing that the risk of a security can be 
decomposed into two parts. Sharpe suggested the one aspect risk could be diversified 
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borne by investors if they held a sub-set of the market portfolio, and since this risk could 
be avoided at no additional cost, it is not compensated for. Non-diversifiable risk, Sharpe 
stated, is unavoidably borne by investors and is thus rewarded. Sharpe referred to non-
diversifiable risk as "systematic risk" and to diversifiable risk as "specific risk". Given the 
common factor of every marketable asset is "systematic risk" (as reflected by the beta of 
the asset to the market), beta became the determining factor in the asset pricing model. 
This model was simple and elegant and became known as the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM). Ironically, at around the same time Litner (1965) and Mossin (1966) were 
also deriving the CAPM. A more detailed discussion of the development of the CAPM will 
be examined in section 2.2. 
The CAPM is essentially an expectations model of equilibrium asset prices, and implies 
that the risk premium on any individual asset or portfolio is the product of the risk premium 
on the market portfolio and the beta co-efficient of the asset. The beta co-efficient is 
estimated by covariance of the asset with the market portfolio as a fraction of the variance 
of the market portfolio. The most important implication of the CAPM however is that 
individuals will only be compensated for bearing market risk, and not unique risk. 
Subsequently, many researchers have suggested extensions of the CAPM and it's 
underlying assumptions, for example Meyers (1972), Merton (1973), Brennan (1970) and 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979). 
2.1.2 Portfolio Diversification 
The principle of diversification was explored in the seminal work of Markowitz (1959) titled: 
"Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments." This work on portfolio 
diversification was later extended by John and Archer (1968), Wagner and Lau (1971) and 
Merton (1973). The primary lesson of the literature on portfolio diversification asserts that 
the investor can eliminate some of the risk of the portfolio through spreading an 
investment across many assets will. These central concepts on the subject of portfolio 
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2.1.2.1 Two-asset case 
Following Bodie, Kane and Marcus (1997), the case for a portfolio of two assets where the 
expected returns of each asset being E(r1 ) and E(r2 ) , and the weights of each asset 
being WI and W2 , with the expected return on the portfOlio defined as: 
E(rp) = wIE(rj ) +w2E(r2 ) 
The variance of each asset's returns is 
with the covariance between returns being 
... {2.1 ) 
... (2.2) 
... {2.3) 
We additionally assume that the correlation coefficient between the two asset's returns is 
p, (-1< p < 1) where p is defined as: 
P 
... (2.4) 
If p = 1, the two asset's returns are perfectly positively (linearly) correlated to each other, 
and always move in the same direction. For p = -1, the converse applies, and for p = 0, 
the asset returns are not related. 
Given that the portfolio variance is defined as 
0"; = yarer p ) 
E~p -E(rp)]2 
= E[w, (rl - E(rl )) + w2 (r2 - E(rz))]2 
== wi E(rj - E(rl ))2 + w; E(r2 - E(rz )2 + 2Wl w2 [E(rl - E(rj )(r2 E(r2 )] 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
= Wl 0"1 + W2 0"2 + WI W 2 0"12 
2 2 2 2 2 
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Markowitz (1959) showed that that the portfolio variance is influenced by, amongst other 
factors, the sign and size of p. If p = -1, portfolio risk can be eliminated. Even with O<p <1, 
the portfolio can be reduced (although not to zero) through diversification. Given the 
assessment that the portfolio risk can be reduced through diversification, Merton (1972) 
showed that that there exists a set of weights that would be optimal for an investor to hold 
in each asset to achieve the least possible portfolio risk. By differentiating the portfolio risk 
with respect to W1. Merton showed that: 
8(0";) 2 2 
--'--=2wj O"j -2(1-wl )0"2 +2(1-2wl )pO"I0"2 =0 awl 
Solving for W1 in 2.6, 
or, 
2.1.2.2 For many assets: 











Merton showed that the proportion to hold in each stock w* in a portfolio of n stocks in 
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v tg is defined as the elements of the inverse of the variance covariance matrix, and 
2.1.3 Optimal Risky Portfolio 
The previous section highlighted how investors are able to construct portfolios in order to 
lower the portfolio risk (to the extent of constructing portfolios with the least possible risk 
i.e. minimum variance portfolio). Markowitz however argued that investors are mean -
variance efficient, i.e. expecting the highest return for each level of risk. The portfolios 
which satisfy the mean-variance criterion are known as the efficient portfolio and 
subsequently lie on the efficient frontier. The quantification of these proportions were 
initially proposed by Markowitz in the following formulation: 
MinZ = W'LW - /LW'p 
Subject to 0:::; wi :::; 1, i = 1, ...• n ,which requires that the portfolio have no short sales. 
Thus varying A will yield the efficient frontier. 
E(return) 
Rf 
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The efficient frontier in Figure 2.1 thus shows all combinations of expected return and 
variance which satisfies the mean-variance criterion. As can be seen, the optimal portfolio 
lies at the position of tangency to the Capital Market line (denoted as CML in Figure 2.1), 
emanating from the risk - free rate (denoted as Rf in Figure 2.1). 
Another formulation used for generating the efficient frontier is given in (2.12). 
Maximise return L wjE(rj ) = W'p ,for each level of variance 
n 
n n 
IIwjwpov(Y;,rj ) = w'r,w 
~ i 
Subject to I Wi == 1 
Wi ;;:: 0 for all i 
... (2.12) 
Computing efficient frontiers using the above algorithms are often computationally 
cumbersome. Bodie, Kane and Marcus (1997) showed that the solution for the weights of 
the optimal portfolio for a portfolio of two assets is explicitly given by: 
[E(rl)- ]a; -[E(r2)- ]Cov(rpr2) 
W I = 2 2 
[E(rl)-rj ]a2 +[E(r2 )-rj ]0'1 -[E(rl) 2rj +E(rl)]Cov(rprz ) 
wz==l-wt 
... (2.13) 
where rj is the risk-free rate. 
A standard assumption accompanying the computation of the optimal portfolio is that 
investors are rational and mean - variance optimizers, i.e. seeking the highest excess 
return with lowest risk. This implies that they would seek to maximize the Sharpe Ratio of 
the portfolio. When maximizing the Sharpe Ratio function with respect to the weights of 
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The weights of the optimal portfolio, Wk given n assets was explored by Merton (1973), 
and given as: 
W k = -'------(A-RC) 
k= 1, ... ,m 
where: 
vlg'is defined as the elements of the inverse of the variance covariance matrix" 
E j is the expected return on the r asset, and 
R f is the rate of return on the risk-free asset. 
... (2.14) 
An underlying assumption in this formulation requires the covariance matrix to have a 
determinant which is non-zero, Le. the matrix is invertible. 
This formulation however does not restrict short sales, and consequently the weights of 
the optimal are not guaranteed to have positive proportions. 
In the next section, Tobin's separation property is outlined. This property allows investors 
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2.1.4 Capital Allocation 
The second stage of the portfolio selection process considers the optimal allocation of the 
investor's portfolio. This stage is concerned with the distribution of the overall portfolio 
between equity and cash, consequently affecting the total risk of the portfolio. Important to 
this process is the risk aversion or preference, lets say c of the investor. In attempting to 
maximise the investors utility, Tobin (1958) in his risk aversion model proposed the 
function involving only the expected return (j.iN) and variance (diN) to be maximised: 
... (2.15) 
In this simple formulation Tobin considers only two assets, i.e. a single risky asset and a 
bundle of risky assets. The risk-less or risk-free asset has a known return, rt, and the risky 
asset has an expected return of pr. It thus follows from 2.15 that: 
... (2.15) 
... (2.16) 
where y is the proportion held in the risk-free asset. The Capital Market Line connecting 
the risky asset to the risk-free asset is given as 
which is a straight line with a slope of (p R ) 
O'R 
Thus, maximising the utility is equivalent to choosing y in order to maximise: 
If/ yrf +(1 Y)PR -(5'S)(1 y)20'i 
a~ -CPR -rf ) +c(1- Y)O'~ = 0 
... (2.17) 
... (2.18) 
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2.2 Capital Asset Pricing Model 
After Markowitz (1952) laid the majority of the groundwork for modern portfolio theory, it 
was only 12 years later that any SUbstantial theory was proposed for predicting equilibrium 
returns. Sharpe (1964), Litner (1965) and Mossin (1966) made major contributions to the 
theory in the area of asset pricing and the model developed is still refered to as the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
The model is summarised in the equation: 
... (2.20) 
where 
E(r) = the expected return on the asset 
E(rm) = the expected return on the market 
rf = the risk-free rate, and 
fJ = the beta of the asset to the market 
= cov(ri' rm) 
var(rm) 
The model is however a simplification of the real-world, and relies on the assumptions that 
markets are ideal in the sense that: 
• They are large and investors are price-takers 
• There are no tax or transaction costs 
• All risky assets (equity) are publicly traded 
• Investors can borrow and lend any amount at a fixed risk-free rate 
• Investors have homogeneous expectations 
In deriving the CAPM formulation, Sharpe assumes a portfolio of two risky assets: the 
market portfOliO, M, and another risky portfolio i, of proportions Xi and {1-xj } respectively. 
The expected return and standard deviation of the combined portfolio pis: 














In deriving the CAPM, Sharpe then noted that to find the slope of the efficient frontier at 
the market portfolio, M, we require: 
... (2.23) 
where all derivatives are evaluated at XI =0. From 2.21 and 2.22: 
... (2.24) 
... (2.25) 
At Xi =0 (point M), we know that (j P = (j m ' and thus, 
... (2.26) 
and substituting 2.24 and 2.26 in 2.23, we have: 
[
OPp] = (PI - Pm)~m 
oXI x,=o aim - am 
... (2.27) 
However, Sharpe realised that the slope at M was equal to the slope of the Capital Market 
Line (CML), thus: 
2 
aim -am 
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and from this we attain the CAPM relationship: 
... (2.29) 
or, in more familiar notation: 
E(r) = rf + fJ[E(rM ) rf ] 
... (2.30) 
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2.3 Theory of Active Portfolio management 
2.3.1 Overview 
Bodie, Kane and Marcus (1997) define active portfolio management to be the process of 
attempting to realise positive active return through adding mispriced shares to the 
portfolio. The lure of active management lies in the challenge to 'beat the market', yet has 
become increasingly difficult. Given a market which is generally efficient, Bishop (1990) 






has access to inside information, or 
concentrates their efforts in an area of the market which is less efficient. 
Thus, given the competitive nature of fund managers and the consequent implied market 
efficiencies, Bishop suggests that the move from active management to more passive 
management has been enthused. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) however maintain that 
there will always be a place for active portfolio management. Their argument follows that 
in the case that funds under active management dry up, prices will no longer reflect 
sophisticated forecasts. The consequent opportunity to research share prices will thus lure 
back active managers who once again expect to take active positions so that their funds 
benefit from this research [see Grossman and Stiglitz, "On the Impossibility of 
Informationally efficient Markets", American Economic Review 70 (June 1980)]. 
Note that a further lure of active management is the potential profits from active 
management, compared to the low commissions from passive management [as noted by 
Berkowitz and Logue (2000)]. 
The central objective of this section is to place this active area of study in the context of 
modern portfolio theory. The primary focus is on establishing a framework for active 
portfolio management with specific emphasis on benchmarking and risk monitoring of 
actively managed portfolios. 
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2.3.2 CAPM and active portfolio management 
One of the valuable results of the CAPM is determining consensus I equilibrium expected 
returns for assets. Black and Litterman (1991) argue that the value in this result is that 
consensus expected returns become a neutral point of reference and thus provide a 
standard of comparison to other generated expected returns. These consensus returns 
can assist active portfolio managers in isolating non-consensus information and ultimately 
aid portfolio design. 
Black and Litterman (1991) formulated a methodology which incorporates the use of 
consensus returns and subjective expected returns to tilt the optimal portfolio away from 
consensus (Le. benchmark portfolio). This methodology is based on the fact that when 
consensus expected returns are used as inputs to a mean-variance optimisation, the 
result would automatically lead to the market (or benchmark) portfolio. The optimal 
portfolio will thus only differ form the market portfolio if the forecasted returns differ to the 
CAPM consensus expected returns. The use of Black and Litterman methodology is 
designed to alleviate the input sensitivity problem suggested by Best and Grauer (1991) to 
a certain extent, and produces optimal portfolios with a greater degree of diversification. 
The rationale behind the using the CAPM for generating consensus expected returns thus 
provides expected returns against which the manager can contrast his own expectations. 
The extent to which active managers differ in their expected returns to that of CAPM 
assists them in making portfolio selection decisions. The relevance of the CAPM to active 
managers thus lies in creating the focus for managers' attention on how they expect to 
add value. See Henk and Winkleman (1998), He and Litterman (1999) and Idzorek (2001) 
for the intuition behind using consensus equilibrium returns and neutral returns. 
In the ensuing section, focus will be turned to outlining literature which has founded the 
basis of active portfolio theory. There is however a lack of extensive literature in this area, 
as most theory of modern portfolio management is based on the premise that financial 
markets are in equilibrium and efficient, thus suggesting active portfolio management is 
futile. Given that a place for active portfolio management does exist, a few academics 
have proposed foundations on which the theory of active portfolio management is 
developed. These foundations are discussed in the ensuing section. 
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2.3.3 Foundations of active management 
Richard Grinold and Ronald Kahn were pioneers in the area of active portfolio theory. In 
their book, Active Portfolio Management (1995), they explore the central aspects of active 
portfolio theory. The primary formulations in the area of active portfolio theory are outlined 
in the subsequent paragraphs. 
To begin, it is noted that in practice, active managers are required to outperform a 
benchmark portfolio that may not be represented by "the market portfolio". This 
requirement encapsulates the aim of active portfolio managers. For that reason, we focus 
hereafter on the benchmark as a notional portfolio which active managers are required to 
outperform. 
In the context of this section, we begin by defining important considerations of active 
managers. 
For time period t, Grinold and Kahn (1995) define active return as: 
rt = rt _ rt 
a p b ... (2.31) 
where rt = active return in period t a 
rl = return on the managed portfolio in period t p 
rt 
b = return on the benchmark portfolio in period t 
Grinold and Kahn calculate the cumulative return for time period t = 1, ... , n, with the 
following formula: 
If a manager is able to achieve a positive active return, he will thus outperform the 
benchmark portfolio. 
... {2.32) 
An important measure in active portfolio management is the dispersion of these active 
returns. This measure is captured by the active risk of the portfolio, more commonly 
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referred to as tracking error, and is defined by Pope and Yadav (1994), Lee (1998) and 
Rudolf, Wolter and Zimmerman (1999) as the variance (standard deviation) of relative 
returns, given as: 
n-l 
... (2.33) 
By construction, a tracking error of zero would imply a perfect benchmark tracking 
portfolio. 
Rudolf, Wolter and Zimmerman (1999) however argued that the quadratic form of tracking 
error is difficult to interpret, and propose a linear deviation of mean absolute deviations, 
defined as: 
1 n 
'If = l:lr; - r:1 
n -1 1=1 
... (2.34) 
Clarke, Krase, and Statman (1994) and Roll (1992) define tracking error as the active 
return (rather than standard deviation of active return) between the portfolio and the 
benchmark. As the former method is more widely accepted by practitioners, we employ 
definition of used in (2.33) in this study. 
Similarly to active return, Grinold and Kahn define active beta as: 
fJa=fJp 1, ... (2.35) 
where fJ p is the beta of the fund relative to the benchmark (as the beta of the benchmark 
relative to itself is 1). 
Residual return, or otherwise know as alpha, is defined by Grinold and Kahn as: 
a p = rp - fJrb ... (2.36) 
This equation implies that the residual returns in period t for a portfolio with return rp is the 
return over-and-above a benchmark portfolio having the same beta. The distinction 
between residual return and active return is simply that active return is not a beta-adjusted 
return. 
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Grinold and Kahn define residual risk thus as the variability of the residual returns: 
... (2.37) 
Given the definition of residual risk, we refer back to active risk (or tracking error). We 
note that 
If/ O"[ra] 
= O"~p - rb ] 











= ~(P _1)2 (}'i + 0"; 
= ~(P _1)2 (}'i + (1- p2)0"! 
beta of portfolio relative to the benchmark 
benchmark volatility 
correlation squared of the portfolio to the benchmark 
portfolio volatility 
... (2.38) 
This decomposition implies that the tracking error is composed of two terms. The first is 
the relative market risk (also referred to as benchmark timing risk). Inherent in this term is 
the beta of the portfolio, as a beta of 1 to the benchmark would collapse this term and 
imply no timing risk. The second term is referred to as residual (or "selection risk"), that is 
governed by the correlation of the portfolio to the benchmark. 
Written in another form: 
Tracking error variance (TEV) = Benchmark timing risk + Selection risk 
A popular measure of the skill of an active manager is the information ratio, defined by 
Grinold and Kahn as: 
... (2.39) 
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Grinold and Kahn have cited an information ratio of 0.5 to be good, and an information 
ratio of 1 to be excellent. The way to interpret an information ratio of 0.5 would be to say 
that a manager could expect an expected residual return of 0.5% for every 1 % of residual 
risk taken. 
Given the fundamentals of active portfolio management reviewed in the prior section, the 
focus now shifts to the quantitative application of the theory to practical issues in the area 
of active portfolio management. As the theme in this thesis is of quantitative applications, 
the application in the area of risk has far more promise in terms of accuracy - than that of 
return. Subsequently, instead of concentrating on methods of outperforming a benchmark 
(return-based strategies), the focus of ensuing chapters thus lies in managing portfolio risk 
relative to a specified benchmark. In the review and development of quantitative risk 
frameworks, the objective lies in assisting active managers not only to outperform their 
benchmark in the long run, but also avoid significant underperformance. 
In the following chapter, the focus is on reviewing the standard optimisation framework put 
forward by Markowitz (1952), and demonstrating its practical application using the Black -
Litterman methodology adjustment for return inputs. 
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CHAPTER 3: PORTFOLIO OPTIMISATION IN ACTIVE 
PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 
The optimsation framework introduced by Markowitz in 1952 formed the basis for an 
inspired quantification of the portfolio design process. The extent of the breakthrough lead 
to a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1990 for Markowitz, and was heralded as the accepted 
theoretical model to transform the information on assets (in the form of expected returns, 
covariances and variances) into a portfolio. However, the use of Markowitz's framework 
has been limited in practice. 
3.1 Drawbacks of traditional mean-variance optimization 
One would expect that given the straightforward mathematics of the portfolio optimization 
problem, the accurate estimation procedures for measuring risk and the significant 
technical advances in computing power - that Markowitz's quantitative framework would 
be at the forefront of the critical decision of portfolio design. Unfortunately the resulting 
optimised portfolios have tended to yield extreme and implausible portfolio weights. 
Additionally these weights also tend to be very sensitive to small changes in expected 
returns. 
To this point, Michaud (1990) argued that mean-variance optimizers are estimation error 
maximisers. The result is that estimation error of expected returns (of lesser confidence) is 
not accommodated for. Best and Grauer (1991) also show that the results of the 
optimisation process is highly sensitive to inputs, and any slight change to the inputs of the 
optimisation may lead to dramatic changes in the results. Best and Grauer also point out 
that that the optimal portfolio is often concentrated in a few assets, and is not represented 
by a well - diversified portfolio. This lack of diversification is revealed in the optimal 
portfolio dominated by the assets with the highest return. Best and Grauer lastly suggest 
that return estimates for expected returns in the optimisation are unreliable, being poor 
predictors of future stock returns. 
Henk and Winkleman (1998) later suggested that the resultant optimal portfolio may also 











Chapter 3:Portfolio Optimisation in active portfolio management 
think in terms of portfolio weights, the mapping between expected returns and optimal 
portfolio weights are difficult to understand. 
Another practical problem is that practitioners often do not hold a view in terms of an 
expected return for every asset, as pointed out by He and Litterman (1999). Asset 
manager~ usually have reasonable research information on only a select number of assets 
- however the Markowitz formulation usually requires expected returns to be specified for 
every asset in the opportunity set. Thus the useful information on a few assets is typically 
swamped by the poorer estimates, as the traditional process has no way of distinguishing 
reliable information from the unreliable information. In practice the effort required by 
managers to obtain reasonable estimates of returns for every asset is generally thought to 
be far too onerous - and outweighs the benefits of the quantitative process. 
Several attempts have been made to resolve the practical problems of quantitative 
portfolio design. Most acknowledge that the use of historical returns instead of expected 
returns are problematic - and that when forecasted returns are used, estimation errors are 
not taken into account. 
3.2 Improvements on standard mean-variance optimisation using 
Black Litterman 
These practical problems led to the pioneering work by Black and Litterman (1992) aimed 
at reshaping modern portfolio theory in order to make it more amenable to portfolio 
managers. Black and Litterman initially focused on highlighting the shortcomings of 
several alternative methods for specifying a starting point for expected returns (for 
example historical means and equal means). Thereafter they pointed out that a neutral 
starting reference is needed for expected return inputs - and that market consensus 
provides the neutral expected returns which yield the benchmark weights under conditions 
of market equilibrium. 
Black and Litterman proceed to develop an approach whereby investors need only specify 
returns on assets that they have views on. Furthermore their derivation differentiates 
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views to be stated in a relative fashion. That is, the user need only specify the relative 
amount by which one asset is expected to outperform another, rather than individual 
absolute returns. 
This section demonstrates the intuition behind the Black-Litterman model using a global 
asset allocation setting - viewed from the perspective of a South African investor. This 
section follows the demonstration of Black and Litterman(1992) as well as the more recent 
report by He and Litterman (1999). Our empirical demonstration considers the allocation 
between the major asset classes from a local investor perspective. Thus our opportunity 
set of risky assets under consideration are: Local Equity, Local Bonds, Foreign Equity, 
Foreign Bonds and Foreign Cash. In our later developments we introduce a benchmark 
comprising the component asset allocation weightings of the Global Alexander-Forbes 
Top 10 Large Manager Watch. Note our focus is on the optimal choice of risky assets -
hence we exclude local cash from our universe of risky assets, as according to 
conventional theory, the choice of risky assets is made separately - where after the 
proportionate blend of the risk - free asset follows. 
3.3 Empirical examples using traditional mean-variance 
optimisation 
Following Black and Litterman (1992) and He and Litterman (1999) we begin by 
demonstrating the shortcomings arising from using a variety on non-neutral return 
specifications. 
3.3.1 Equal returns as input 
The na"ive approach of specifying all expected return inputs as equal was first dealt with; 
thereafter the results of using historical returns as a frame of reference was considered . 
All means were set equal to the historical average of the assets under consideration (that 
is 18% p.a.). 
The assumption that the investor has only one relative view is first held: that is that Local 
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view into the optimisation process, the expected return for Local Equity is shifted up by 
3% to 21% (i.e. 18% + 3%) and the return of Foreign Equity is shifted down by 3% to 15% 
(i.e. 18% - 3%). 
Table 3.1 shows the input returns for each asset in the opportunity set. 




,. .c ~ 
B ::I C " c:r & :::s C' w Scenario .B' Ii c .i c '- 1 II ,f ! ~ § e e 
iii l 11 fl : 
Equal Retums 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 
Retums shifted, for view 21% 18% 18% 15% 18% 
The optimisation process was run separately using the two return scenarios in Table 3.1. 
The covariance input requirement was taken as the historical covariance matrix of returns 
over the prior 5 year period as given in Table 3.2. 




ocal Bonds 172.22 148.14 
Foreign Cash -113.55 -100.28 251.92 
Foreign Equity 200.71 -20.94 180.03 402.49 
Foreign Bonds -73,63 -69.79 190.42 140.60 170.22 
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• Equal retums 
• Equal retums shifted for Local Equity 
and Foreign Equity 
Figure 3.1: Optimal Portfolio using Equal returns and Equal returns shifted for Local Equity 
and Foreign Equity view 
Figure 3.1 shows that using equal means as a starting point yields vastly unintuitive 
portfolio weights - with only 1.2% in Local Equity and -9.2% in Foreign Equity. Adjusting 
the return inputs to accommodate the view depicted in the second scenario of Table 3.1 
results in the portfolio weights depicted in the maroon bars in Figure 3.1. A small relative 
shift in the expected return (3% for Local Equity and -3% for Foreign Equity) has 
translated into huge swings in the weights of these two asset classes. The weight for 
Local Equity has increased to 18.6% and Foreign Equity has decreased to -31 .3%. 
Additionally the weights for the asset classes for which there were no views also changed 
significantly. These weights are clearly not practically intuitive, given the return input. 
3.3.2 Historical returns and Neutral returns as inputs 
The process of using historical averages as forecasts for expected returns are widely 
known to yield very poor estimates. Nevertheless in our demonstration we use the prior 5 
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These estimates are depicted in Figure 3.2 together with the consensus returns discussed 
in the ensuing section. 
Black and Litterman propose that the only set of "neutral" returns would be the set of 
expected returns that would clear the market if all investors had identical, i.e. consensus, 
views. Hence their model starts with equilibrium expected returns generated by the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model. It is easy to show that these "neutral" returns are the unique 
set of return inputs that can be effectively derived from reverse optimisation (where the 
optimal portfoliO is the market portfolio). These derivations are generalized, effectively 
replacing the market portfolio with any specified benchmark. Consequently the resulting 
"neutral" returns are the only ones which lead to the optimal portfolio having the precise 
benchmark weights. In the demonstration, the specified the benchmark specified is the 
Global top 10 Large Manager Watch peergroup. 
In Table 3.3 below the set of historical returns together with the set of neutral (or 
henceforth consensus) returns used as inputs are shown. 
Table 3.3: Annualised historical returns and Concensus Returns 
f .-,. .c 'a :t I c: H " .B' 0 :s a U m 
~ i c: c: c 
if f CD ] ! i ~. ~ ~ 
~latoricaIRetum8 " 
12.8% 17.6% 23.1% 18.8% 21 .3% 
~oncensu8/Retum8 
20.2% 14.7% 11.6% 15.6% 12.0% 
Figure 3.2 shows the resulting optimal weights using mean-variance optimisation. When 
historical returns are used, the resulting weights are even more extreme than was the 
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• Histori cal Retums 0 Concensus Retums 
Figure 3.2: Optimal Portfolio using Historical returns and Concensus returns 
It is well known that there is substantial forecast error in using historical returns as 
forecasts for expected returns - and as stated previously estimation error-maximisation is 
clearly the problem. Clearly a portfolio with -4.3% in local equity and -10.1 % in foreign 
equity is impractical from any portfolio manager perspective. 
One would expect that all managers would have positive weighting of all of the asset 
classes in mind. From Figure 3.2 it is evident that the consensus set of input views have 
resulted in the optimal weights all being positive (and very plausible). Because of the 
reverse optimisation analogy we are not surprised that these set of weights are precisely 
the benchmark weights (of the top 10 pension funds) - as they have been formulated with 
this in mind. 
As Black-Litterman state, the neutral (consensus) concept, on its own, is not particularly 
useful - however its value comes to the fore when one combines consensus views with 
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In the ensuing section the innovative approach devised by Black and Litterman to 
realistically accommodate input views is demonstrated. As one will see this is one of the 
more complex features of their approach - but undoubtedly the most innovative. 
3.4. Empirical examples using Concensus Returns as neutral 
returns 
There are a variety of ways that one can translate views into expected returns using 
concensus returns as neutral returns. We will consider each one briefly. 
• A direct adjustment to the consensus returns for the assets involved in the view. 
• A simple Bayesian-weighted adjustment between the consensus return vector and the 
direct view - where the weighting scheme reflects the confidence in the view. The 
objective here is to enable a transparent desensitization of the forecast errors. 
• Using the Black and Litterman approach that adjusts the view to be "covariance 
consistent". that is. it allows the view to adjust the input returns on other assets 
according to their covariance between the assets having the view imposed. 
3.4.1. Direct adjustment to consensus returns 
The same view as previously stated is considered. i.e. that Local Equity is expected to 
outperform Foreign Equity by 6%. As can be seen from the consensus returns in Table 
3.4. under equilibrium conditions. Local Equity is expected to outperform Foreign Equity 
anyway by 4.6%. Hence to implement our view one needs only shift the expected return 
on Local Equity up by 0.7% to 20.9% and to reduce Foreign Equity by -0.7% to 14.9% (so 
that 20.9% - 14.9% = 6%. the view) as depicted in Table 3.4 below. Otherwise the return 
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Table 3.4. Concensus Returns and Tilted Concensus Returns for Local Equity and Foreign 
Equity 
~ .. .. -= " ~ .. :::I c: " • "" .. & :::I C 0 au 
"" 0 i 
~ - c c: c: 
1 
g 11 CD 
! ! i 
I. : :. 
Adjusted Concensus 
20.9% 14.7% 11 .6% 14.9% 12.0% 
Concensus Returns 
20.2% 14.7% 11 .6% 15.6% 12.0% 
• Own Views .Concensus 
12.1% 
2.2110 4.6% 
Figure 3.3: Optimal Portfolio using Own Views and Concensus returns 
Once more it is evident from Figure 3.3 that the optimal weights of the consensus returns 
yield the benchmark weights (blue bars). Most puzzling are the weights emanating from 
the returns adjusted by the view. The difference between the return inputs (between the 
view and consensus depicted in Table 3.4) was extremely small- yet the difference in the 
optimal weights is not only extreme, but also result in an unrealistic portfolio (shown in the 
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the assets unaffected by the view - this can also be confusing to managers. This latter 
point is addressed by the Black and Utterman approach and is indeed one of its most 
innovative features. 
3.4.2 Bayesian-weighted adjustment to consensus returns to capture 
confidence in views. 
The second scenario is based on an attempt to desensitize the forecast errors in expected 
returns (and consequently the unrealistic portfolio tilts) in order to address the problem of 
optimisers tilting too much on potential forecast errors. 
A straightforward approach of weighting our return view by our confidence (expressed as 
a proportion) with the consensus return (multiplied by 1 minus our confidence proportion) 
is used. As consensus returns yield the benchmark weights - this process is intended to 
ensure that portfolios gravitate towards the benchmark. The weighting scheme is used to 
generate a new set of returns, formulated as below: 
E(lj) = (1- w)Rconcensus + wROwnView 
where w = confidence in the view of asset i 
RConcensus = con census return for asset i, and 
ROwnView = return of own view on asset i 
We note that zero confidence in our own view ensures the final input return is the same as 
concensus. 
Table 3.5 below shows two return input scenarios: the first is the unadjusted consensus 
returns and the second scenario gives a the Bayesian-weighted approach assuming 50% 
confidence in our view that Local equity will outperform Foreign Equity by 6%. 
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Table 3.5: Concensus Returns and Bayesian-weighted Returns 
~ 
(I 
(I .c " ~. 
= 
::t a " .B' ::t a (.) ID c:r 
W III I:: I:: I:: - ii 9 at f ~ .3 .I! i fl. 0 fl. u. 
~dJusted Concansus 
20.6% 14.7% 11.6% 15.3% 12.0% 
ConcensusRatums 
20.2% 14.7% 11.6% 15.6% 12.0% 
From the Table 3.5 it is clear that for assets with no non-consensus views, the returns are 
the same as consensus. 
The resulting optimal portfolio weights for the Bayesian-weighted returns are shown in the 
Figure 3.4 that follows. They are contrasted to the results without the confidence 
adjustment discussed in Figure 3.3 (in other words assuming 100% confidence in the 
view). 
_ Own View _ Weighted Concensus 
2.2% 3.8% 
Figure 3.4: Optimal weights for Bayesian-weighted returns at 50% confidence contrasted to 
100% confidence 
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The results of the Bayesian weighted approach show a substantial improvement in the 
size (and hence realism) of the tilt - yet still has tilts away from the benchmark for the 
remaining assets having no views. 
3.4.3. Black and Litterman adjustment to consensus returns 
As stated above, whilst the consensus returns are an important feature in enabling 
portfolios to gravitate towards the benchmark - when a view is imposed, the assets 
unaffected by the view (i.e. still having consensus return inputs), yield weights which are 
significantly different from the benchmark. 
The multivariate derivation of Black and Litterman result in the expected returns of all 
assets in the opportunity set being affected by the view imposed. In essence the Black-
Litterman model thus adjusts the expected returns away from their consensus values in a 
manner which is consistent with the underlying covariances and the view being 
expressed. 
Although these adjustments aren't always immediately transparent (because of the 
complex interaction between the inputs and the optimisation process) - the innovative 
feature of this approach is observed in the transparency of the optimal weights that 
intuitively reflect the initial views. 
The Black-Litterman conditional expected return formulation has two levels of 
sophistication: 
The first formulation assumes 100% confidence in the views imposed i.e. : 
Ji = TI'+r L·P'.[P. r L·p'r1 • [Q - p. TI'] 
The second formulation accommodates the level of confidence in the view 
where 
L = Covariance matrix of returns for the n assets 
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r :: scalar which measures the uncertainty of the Covariance matrix 
P :: Matrix identifying assets involved in investor's subjective views 
n :: Diagonal covariance matrix representing the uncertainty of each view 
IT = vector of concensus I market equilibrium returns 
and 
Q=p.p' 
We give some intuition to the rather complex formulation for the case where 100% 
confidence is assumed. As expected, the formulation begins with the neutral returns, TI', 
and proceeds to modify these returns given the covariance structure and views. The term 
[Q - p. TI'] is where the investors view is formulated, and represents the difference 
between the concensus return and the investor's expected return for those assets for 
which he has a view. The term r r·p'.[p· r r·p,]-I is used to make the investor's return 
views covariance consistent. This is done through ensuring the returns of assets with 
views are consistent with the returns of assets with no views, as represented in the 
covariance matrix of returns between all assets. 
Again we assume the same view, i.e. that Local Equity outperforms Foreign Equity by 6%. 
The Black-Litlerman is able to implement this view directly without specifying the absolute 
return differences (required by the previous approaches). The innovative use of the P 
matrix above captures the relevant assets whilst the Q vector captures the actual view. 
We thus define Pas: 
p = (1 0 0 -1 0), 
and Q as 
Q=6%, 
which satisfies the equation Q = p. Ii . 
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The use of 1 in the position of Local Equity and -1 in the position of Foreign Equity 
ensures that the difference between the expected return of these two assets is 6%. 
Using the Black Litterman formulation to calculate f.1 ' the consensus returns is contrasted 
to the resulting Black-Litterman return inputs obtained in Table 3.6 that follows. 
Table 3.6: Concensus Returns and Black Litterman Returns for results view for Local Equity 
and Foreign Equity tilt 
iii 
~ 3 :t f 
.c 
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Black LlUerman Retums 
21 .2% 15.1% 11.0% 15.2% 11.6% 
Concensus Returns 
'" ~ 20.2% 14.7% 11.6% 15.6% 12.0% 
From Table 3.6 we see that the Black-Litterman formulation has resulted in the input 
returns changing for all asset classes - not only those involving the view. While this may 
at first seem unintuitive, the shifts are in fact a natural consequence of the 
interrelationships between these asset classes. More important however is the impact of 
these expected returns on the optimal portfolio. Figure 3.5 shows the resulting optimal 
weights of the Black-Litterman approach of incorporating the view contrasted to the 
consensus optimal portfolio. It is evident from Figure 3.5 that the investment weight in 
Local Equity has increased from 60.3% to 72.4% and the weight in Foreign Equity has 
declined from 12.1 % to -0.1 %, entirely consistent with the view expressed. 
The most significant feature of the Black-Litterman portfolio however is that optimal 
weights have only tilted away from the benchmark weights for those asset classes for 
which a view has been stated. The classes: Local Bonds, Foreign Cash and Foreign 
Bonds retain their benchmark weights. This feature is consistent across all Black-
Litterman applications and emphasizes why views have to impact on all expected return 
inputs in order to yield intuitive portfolio tilts. 










Chapter 3: Portfolio Optimisation in active portfolio management 
• Black Lilterman Retums (relative view) 
[J C oncensus 
2.0'11 2.0'11 
Figure 3.S: Optimal Portfolio using Black Litterman Returns using relative view and 
Concensus returns 
3.5. Summary 
The starting point of this section was to demonstrate that consensus returns are an 
important feature in enabling portfolios to gravitate towards the benchmark weights. The 
latter focus of the report was on the innovative Black-Litterman approach to 
accommodating non-consensus views in quantitative portfolio design. We note that the 
aim of this section was merely to demonstrate the intuitive and realistic results of using 
Black Litterman returns in a South African optimisation context using an asset allocation 
setting. 
Our empirical demonstration (using a typical global balanced mandate setting) highlighted 
the advances this approach affords over more traditional approaches. An important 
feature was the manner in which the expected returns of all assets in the opportunity set 
are affected by a view imposed on only a select number of assets. In essence the Black-
Litterman model adjusts the expected returns away from their consensus values in a 
manner which is consistent with the underlying covariance's and the view being 
expressed. 
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Although these adjustments aren't always immediately transparent (because of the 
complex interaction between the inputs and the optimisation process) - the innovative 
feature of this approach is observed in the transparency of the optimal weights that 
intuitively reflect the initial views. 
In the following chapter, the broad area of benchmarking is reviewed, with specific 
emphasis on the practical application of selecting, constructing and estimating 
benchmarks in the South African context. 










Chapter 4: Benchmarking 
CHAPTER 4: BENCHMARKING 
In this chapter, the irrportant area of benchmarking and its application to active fund 
management is discussed and documented. Where necessary, an empirical analysis is 
performed to verify assertions made in this chapter. The importance of benchmarking is 
discussed in section 4.1 followed by the selection of benchmarks in section 4.2, where 
after the topic of construction of benchmarks is discussed in section 4.3 and estimation of 
benchmarks examined in section 4.4. 
4.1. Importance of Benchmarking 
The fund owner or trustee traditionally has the customary role to provide the fund 
manager with instructions as to the broad investment performance that the fund manager 
should produce. Specifying a benchmark portfolio to a fund manager is typically the most 
efficient manner for a trustee to communicate the investment requirements. The 
importance of employing a benchmark portfolio is thus evident, as the benchmark portfolio 
becomes a point of reference and standard of comparison for the fund manager and 
trustee. 
The trustee I investor would additionally require the fund manager to outperform this 
benchmark, as well as not to take on significant risk against this benchmark, as this may 
lead to underperformance of the benchmark. The fund manager's performance is thus 
judged relative to the benchmark, and absolute performance is of less importance. Thus, 
the notion of risk based on relative performance has become ever more important to fund 
managers and investors alike. This relative risk, referred to as tracking error, has emerged 
as an important measure for managing and monitoring the fund's risks relative to a 
benchmark. The benchmark allows fund managers to quantify and understand the risks 
taken against the benchmark, as relative returns cannot be attained without taking any 
relative risk. 
A benchmark is an index most representative of a portfolio's investment objective class. 
Investors can use the benchmark as a reference point when monitoring fund performance. 
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The requirements of a benchmark according to Bishop (1999) are as follows: 
i) Investable 




The two main types of benchmarks are index benchmarks and peer-group (consensus) 
benchmarks. Other less widely used benchmarks are those linked to economic indicators 
e.g. CPI, PPI. There exists a distinct difference between the construction of index 
benchmarks and peergroup benchmarks as well as the conceptual thinking in using either. 
An index benchmark replicates the performance of a sector of stocks, constructed on a 
market capitalisation basis. The constituents of indices are publicly known on a daily 
basis, making the tracking of the index's performance straightforward to replicate. The use 
of index benchmarks are primarily for the purpose of exact replication, i.e. index funds, yet 
are also used when attempting to outperform the index by taking active stock bets against 
the index compositions. 
The construction of a peergroup benchmark involves using the average holdings of 
competing funds in the investment category, regardless of the size of funds. This 
benchmark thus aims to replicate the average performance of funds in the investment 
category. The use of the peergroup benchmarks is primarily linked to the concern of cash 
in- or outflows based on the performance rankings tables. 
This increasing concern of performance ranking among competitors has compelled fund 
managers to be ever more cognisant of their relative risk against the peer group. As 
benchmark choice becomes essential, significant departures from a benchmark that 
differs too radically from peer competitors would expose funds to the risk of significant 
relative (to competitors) underperformance. From a relative risk perspective this is likely to 
account for a substantial contribution to tracking error against the peer group. This 
realization that the peer group concept is important has led many fund managers to use 
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The importance of benchmarks in modern fund management has thus grown due to 
various factors. 
i) Due to the increasing availabil ity and awareness of investment funds, investors 
seek to invest in funds that perform well in relation to other competing funds. The 
value of performance and risk management relative to a benchmark which 
represents these competing opportunities I funds has thus become important to 
investors. 
ii) Benchmarks also allow fund managers to keep track of a smaller set of assets (in 
the benchmark) as opposed to all assets in the market universe. Funds with fewer 
stocks have lower trading costs and are generally easier to manage. For practical 
purposes, fund managers often design benchmark proxies, which are a smaller 
subset of stocks in the actual benchmark. These proxies are constructed and 
aimed at closely replicating the performance of the actual benchmark, with the 
least amount of active risk against the benchmark. 
iii) Benchmarks also allow fund managers to focus their efforts on outperforming a 
specific 'notional' portfolio. The benchmark functions as a point of reference for the 
fund manager, who focuses on beating his I her benchmark 
The benchmark has to be reflective of the investor's risk profile, as well as long -term 
expectations of the benchmark's performance. Since employing benchmarks in portfolio 
management is vital, the selection and assessment of the appropriate benchmarks, given 
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4.2 Selection of Benchmarks 
Selection of the appropriate benchmark for the investor is an important decision in the 
investment process, and should thus be given sufficient consideration. However, the 
selection of the most appropriated benchmark is difficult since there exists no accepted 
process for selection of benchmarks. The motive for selecting a benchmark however gives 
investors some guidance as to appropriated benchmarks, with these motives being either 
one of risk level desired, of return expectations of the investor, or of both. Thus there 
exists considerations based on risk as well as considerations based on return / 
outperformance. 
When investors select benchmarks based on risk considerations, the success of the 
benchmarks relies on the assumption that risk characteristics of the benchmark 
constituents remain fairly stable. Thus, risk estimates I forecasts (volatilities and 
correlations) using historical data will provide good estimates of future risk characteristics. 
The validity of this assumption will be tested later in the chapter. Two examples where 
benchmarks are selected on risk considerations are: 
• When attempting to track an investment mandate I process (e.g. indexation 
benchmark tracking, hedging) 
• When accommodating several levels of risk (absolute) to match client profiles 
Both of these examples will be discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter. In 
particular, we highlight some considerations when constructing a benchmark in the case 
of tracking an investment process. 
Selection of benchmarks based on expected return (i.e. outperformance) is in itself 
difficult. The investor would have to consider the alpha of various benchmarks, based 
either on historical data, or a model forecasting expected returns for the constituents of 
the benchmark. Thus, an example of a benchmark selected based on return or 
outperformance would be when an attempt is made to identify a benchmark portfolio that 
is expected to systematically consistently outperform an index or peergroup category. 
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For example some managers in South Africa have created a benchmark by down-
weighting the Resource component in the All Share Index. Clearly there is an expectation 
that Resources will systematically under-perform. Thus, it is anticipated that this 
benchmark will outperform the All Share Index. 
We briefly review this process in a subsequent section of this chapter. 
Once a benchmark is chosen the fund manager may need to find a suitable proxy for the 
benchmark, and construct this proxy to meet the purpose of the benchmark. We now 
review a framework which will assist us in constructing and assessing the appropriateness 
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4.3 Construction of appropriate benchmarks 
As mentioned, the construction of a benchmark (or benchmark proxy) thus depends on 
which of the above-mentioned applications are relevant. To begin, the construction of 
benchmarks when attempting to track an investment process, e.g. indexation, 
benchmarking or hedging is reviewed in the ensuing section. 
4.3.1 Construction of stock proxies for indexation. benchmarking and 
hedging 
There are a variety of applications where a proxy consisting of fewer stocks than some 
underlying series are typically required. From a practical perspective, series containing a 
large number of stocks are usually cumbersome to replicate in practice - and stock 
proxies consisting of a reduced number of stocks are often a practical necessity. Some 
applications where a basket of fewer stocks are utilised, include: 
• index tracking 
• benchmark tracking (where the benchmark may for example be some aggregate of 
peer holdings) 
• portfolio hedging 
In each of the above-mentioned applications the ultimate success of the stock proxy is 
related to its ability to generate a return commensurate of the return of the underlying 
series. Traditional approaches to stock proxy construction usually attempt to match the 
component holdings of the underlying series using a smaller set of stocks selected on the 
basis of their market capitalisation. The success of the stock proxy hinges to a large 
extent on the return differences between the stocks in the proxy and those excluded. 
From a stock proxy design perspective the return of stocks cannot however be predicted 
in advance - but we are able to predict the risks more accurately in advance. Thus the 
only reliable way one can match the return of a proxy to the return of the series in 
advance is to ensure that the risks of the stock proxy are matched as accurately as 
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proxy construction ther~fore is to monitor whether the underlying risks are adequately 
matched to the underlying series. 
As it turns out the larger market capitalisation stocks in the South Africa environment tend 
to have different systematic risk characteristics to medium and smaller stocks (most often 
the excluded stocks) creating a relative bias in the risks and consequently the return of 
stock proxies constructed on the basis of market capitalisations. 
Figure 1 for example portrays the betas (versus the ALSI) of the Small Cap, Mid Cap and 
Large Cap indices. The betas are calculated as the slope of the linear regression between 
the market cap index and the ALSI. As is evident in figure 1 Large Cap stocks tend to 
have larger betas (as reflected in the high beta of the Large Cap Index, of 1.06) by 
contrast to the betas of Mid Cap and Small Cap indices (0.89 and 0.78 respectively). This 
systematic beta bias inherent in the size of many firms can create problems when proxies 
are constructed by selecting stocks on the basis of their size first. 











SmaHOap Mid Gap Large Cap 
Figure 4.1: Betas (vs ALSI) of the Small, Medium and Large Cap Indices 
In this section we highlight how the traditional construction of stock proxies typically lead 
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discrepancies. We also give some guidance as to how to counter or rebalance the 
unwanted risks of the stock proxy. 
4.3.1.1 Method and discussion 
To assess the success of a stock proxy, one ideally needs to assess the ability the stock 
proxy has of tracking the returns of the underlying series it was designed to proxy. The 
most appropriate measure for assessing the success of a stock proxy, therefore, is the 
tracking error, interestingly a measure of risk. The extent of the tracking error of the stock 
proxy relative to the underlying series reflects the disparity of return between the proxy 
and the underlying series (actually the dispersion of the return differences). Thus the 
quantitative objective in the stock proxy design should focus on minimising the risk 
measure, tracking error, foremost. 
A further rationale for using the tracking error measure is that it encapsulates both of the 
important aspects of dissimilarity via (1) the beta (relative timing) and (2) the residual risk 
(stock selection). Often practitioners unwittingly use correlation (related to selection risk 
only) as a measure of similarity between the stock proxy and the underlying series. The 
problem with the exclusive use of correlation as a proxy design measure is that the 
relative timing risk is not considered. The relative timing risk is however of considerable 
importance, as a stock proxy having a beta different to the series it was designed to track, 
results in an unwanted timing bet against the underlying series. This is an important point, 
as any systematic volatility will result in return discrepancies emanating from the proxy. 
Typically, the most common method of constructing stock proxies is based on the use of a 
"market capitalisation" approach, which selects stocks with highest market capitalisation 
from the component holdings in the series first. This construction approach typically leads 
to a large market capitalisation bias in the stock proxy. Because large market capilisation 
stocks tend to have relatively higher betas in the South African equity market, the potential 
exists that the stock proxy construction process could inadvertently create a timing bet 
against the underlying series. 
To demonstrate the systematic bias caused by stock proxy construction based on the 
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on an equally weighted aggregate of the Unit Trusts in the General Equity category) as an 
example of the underlying series we will attempt to proxy. Our demonstration considers 
stock proxies based on market capitalisation for the above series with an ever-decreasing 
number of stocks. 
4.3.1.2 Data 
Our data consists of the actual aggregate compositions of the General Equity Unit Trusts 
as at end of June 2001. We construct market capitalisation-based stock proxies, and 
compare the impact on the risk characteristics of reducing the number of stocks in the 
proxy. For simplicity purposes, we consider 150 of the most widely held stocks to 
comprise the population in the General Equity peergroup benchmark. We depict the 
relationships graphically in scatter diagrams as well as quantitatively by considering the 
resulting expected tracking error, beta, correlation, benchmark timing risks, and stock 
selection risks implicit in the various stock proxies. Our analysis is based on weekly return 
data from November 1999 to September 2001. 
Our scattered diagrams are composed as follows: 
On the horizontal (x) axis, we plot the returns of the underlying series. On the vertical (y) 
axis we plot the matched time series returns of the proposed stock proxy. If the stock 
proxy was able to track the underlying series, we'd expect the matched pairs of return 
points to lie exactly on the 45° line. Any departures from the 45° line would reflect the 
disparity between the proposed stock proxy and the underlying series, as a consequence 
of different holdings. The extent of the dispersion around the line is represented by 
tracking error, and is visually interpreted as the dispersion around the 45° line. 
4.3.1.3 Results 
The results of using all 150 shares in the stock proxy are graphically displayed in the 
scatter plot in Figure 4.2. Clearly, the stock proxy tracks the underling series (GE 
peergroup benchmark) perfectly. All matched returns lie on the 45° line and the expected 
tracking error is zero. However, managing a benchmark based on a 150 stocks may be 
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Figure 4.2: Stock proxy comprising 150 stocks vs the GE 150 stock benchmark 
100 stock proxy ... 
The effect of using a 100 share benchmark proxy is graphically displayed in Figure 4.3. 
Contrasting Figure 4.3 to Figure 4.2 it is evident that the beta against the underling series 
has increased to 1.02, and the tracking error has increased from 0 to 0.88. Consequently 
the 100 stock proxy inherently has a small timing bet reflected against the underlying 
series it was designed to track. We also note that the loss of the 50 smallest market 
capitalisation stocks has generated an expected tracking error of 0.88, although the 
correlation is very high at 99.99%. Clearly this stock proxy is a reasonable one as these 
above-mentioned risks are small, yet the fact that it contains as many as 100 shares may 
still be practically onerous to maintain. 
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Plot of Mmet Cap Stock Proxy against General Equity Benchmm 
r.n.TAI.iti"," Coeffictenf =99.99% 1 





100 shares in Proxy 
Figure 4.3: Stock proxy comprising 100 stocks vs the GE 150. stock benchmark 
80 Stock proxy ... 
We provide the results of using an 80 stock proxy based on market capitalisations for the 
underlying GE benchmark series in Figure 4.4. 
Correlation Coefficient = 99.98% 1 






80 shares in Proxy 
Figure 4.4: Stock proxy comprising 80 stocks vs the GE 150 stock benchmark 
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From the quantitative data displayed in Figure 4.4 it is evident that the beta of the stock 
proxy against the underlying series increases further to 1.04 as portrayed by the 
increased slope of the fitted line in Figure 4.4, with the tracking error increasing to 1.57. 
These measures reflect the extent to which the market capitalisation bias induced by the 
reduced number of stocks in the proxy have resulted in a timing bet against the underlying 
series. As stated previously the increase in the beta in the stock proxy is a consequence 
of the anomaly that larger market capitalisation stocks tend to have larger betas. 
To further demonstrate the impact of reducing the number of stocks in a stock proxy we 
consider the results for further reducing the number of stocks to 60 and 40 stocks as well . 
C'orrelatiion Coefficient = 99.82% i 
I'\UII'UQI,,,,,",U TE = 2.75 i 
"1 
5 
··· IloI .... ··· , ·· .. •• .. · ", · .... · ........ ·, .. • .......... 
5 10 
60 shares in proxy 
Figure 4.5: Stock proxy comprising 60 stocks vs the GE 150 stock benchmark 
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60 Stock proxy ... 
The results for the 60 stock proxy are shown in Figure 4.5. The increasing beta of the 
stock proxy against the underlying series (GE benchmark) now becomes visually marked. 
The beta has increased further to 1.05 and consequently the tracking error has increased 
to a now significant value, i.e. 2.75. 
Proxy against ~ .. n, ...... 1 
Beta = 1.08 
Correlation Coefficiem = 99.77% 
1'\I1~IUIIII:SIIU irE = 3.65 
5 10 
"'1 40 shares in Proxy 
•
10 1 
Figure 4.6: Stock proxy comprising 40 stocks vs the GE 150 stock benchmark 
40 Stock proxy ... 
The results of reducing the number of stocks in the proxy to the 40 largest by market 
capitalisation are shown in Figure 4.6. 
As can be seen from Figure 4.6, using a 40 share stock proxy induces an even larger 
timing risk as seen in the increased beta against the underlying series (to 1.08). This large 
timing bet also manifests itself in the annualised tracking error of 3.65%. Clearly such a 
stock proxy would be inadequate for the purposes of tracking the actual benchmark, as 
too much active risk in the form of timing risk is taken against the underlying series. 
Table 1 gives a summary of our quantitative results of reducing the number of stocks in 
the stock proxies constructed on the basis of selecting stocks with the largest market 
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capitalisation for our demonstration case, i.e. the General Equity peergroup benchmark as 
the underlying series. 
Table 4.1: Results of reducing the number of stocks in the stock proxy for the General 
Equity peergroup benchmark 
Number of stocks EXpected Expected I' Expected 
In proxy . Beta Correlation Annuallsed TE 
" 150 1.00 1.0000 0.00 
!. 
100 1.02 0.9999 0.88 
90 1.03 0.9999 1.21 
80 1.04 0.9998 1.57 
70 1.05 0.9985 2.74 
60 1.05 0.9982 2.75 
50 1.06 0.9982 3.10 
40 1.08 0.9977 3.65 
30 1.11 0.9969 4.81 
Typically one would expect to be able to construct an acceptable stock proxy with as few 
as say 60 stocks. The results of table 1 however highlights that using the method of 
selecting the largest market capitalisation stocks first, results in an unacceptably high 
tracking error as a consequence of the beta bias implicit in the large capitalisation stocks. 
Because of this selection bias one ideally needs a stock proxy construction approach that 
attempts to match the risks of the stock proxy to that of the underlying series more closely. 
Below we highlight how an optimisation approach can be used to construct a stock proxy 
that matches the risks more adequately. 
4.3.1.4. Suggestions for improving the design of stock proxies 
Conceptually the search mechanism for an optimal stock proxy should focus on matching 
the risks and should therefore give consideration to the correlation structure of the 
competing stocks. 
In order to avoid inadvertently constructing a timing bet against the underlying series we 
would want the beta of the stock proxy to be as close to 1 as possible. Furthermore we 
would want the active positions created by the stocks omitted in the stock proxy to be 
offset (diversified away) by the stocks held in the reduced stock proxy as far as possible. 
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That is, we would want to reduce our stock selection risk against the underlying series as 
far as possible. 
The objective of the optimisation should be minimise both the timing risk and stock 
selection risk against the underlying series. Clearly maximising the correlation between 
the stock proxy and the underlying series would be inadequate, as it would not control for 
the timing risk. Note for example one could have a correlation of 1 (perfect correlation) 
between two series - but the beta of one series against another could still be significantly 
different, say 2. 
The appropriate quantitative measure that encapsulates both the timing and stock 
selection risk against the underlying series, is the tracking error. The decomposition of the 
tracking error into a timing risk and selection risk component follows: 
Where f3 is the .beta of the proxy versus the underlying series 
Ob 2 is the volatility of the underling series, or benchmark 
(J'p 
2 is the volatility of the stock proxy 
; is the correlation between the stock proxy and the underlying series. 
The optimisation procedure for minimising If/ is equivalent minimising both of the terms 
capturing the timing and selection risks in the above decomposition. In essence the 
optimisation procedure results in a search for a stock proxy having a beta as close to 1 as 
possible, as well as having a correlation with the underlying series as close to 1 as 
possible. Ultimately the optimisation procedure matches the two central risks as closely as 
possible to that of the underlying series. 
4.3.1.5. Demonstration of the optimisation process 
As a demonstration of the optimisation application, we solve for the optimal stock proxy by 
constraining the optimiser to design a stock proxy based only on two scenarios 
constraining the number of stocks in the stock proxy. Namely we consider redesigning the 
stock proxy from (1) the largest 40 stock holdings, and (2) the largest 60 stock holdings of 
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the General Equity peergroup benchmark. We contrast our results to that of the market 
capitalisation approach. Here we used EXCEL's Solver, which uses an iterative quadratic 
optimization to maximize a given function. 
The summarised results are shown in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 (for the 40 and 60 stock 
scenarios). Interestingly, in the first scenario only 36 stocks were selected by the 
optimisation process, and in the second scenario only 55 stocks were selected by the 
optimiser. 
Con'elation Coefficient = 99.80% i 







36 shares in Proxy 
Figure 4.7: Optimisation-based stock proxy with 40 stock constraint 
From Figures 4.7 and 4.8 we see that the fit of the optimised benchmark proxy is 
considerably improved by increasing the number of stocks from 40 to 60. Further when 
one contrasts these results to that of the 40 and 60 stock market capitalisation-based 
stock proxy there is a significant decline in the tracking errors. Most importantly, the timing 
risk, for all practical purposes, is almost totally eliminated, as the beta of the optimised 
stock proxies are extremely close to 1 against the actual benchmark. 










Chapter 4: Benchmarking 
Plot of Optimised stock Proxy against General Equity Benchmark 
Beta = 1.01 
Correlation Coefficient:; 99.93% 
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Figure 4.8: Optimisation-based stock proxy with 60 $tock constraint 
Table 4.2 gives a comparison of the risk decompositions (into timing and stock selection 
risks) of the various market capitalisation-based stock proxies together with the two 
optimisation-based stock proxies. 
Table 4.2: Tracking error decompositions of market capitalisation-based and optimisation-
based stock proxies 
Stock Selection Rtsk Timing Risk Annuallsed 
Proxy Amount .. PrOportion Amount Proportion TEV 
150 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 
100 0.14 18.4% 0.63 81 .6% 0.77 
90 0.26 17.7% 1.21 82.3% 1.46 
80 0.47 19.2% 1.99 80.8% 2.46 
70 3.97 52.9% 3.54 47.1% 7.51 
60 4.60 60.8% 2.96 39.2% 7.56 
OptImised 80 1.64 93.'3% 0.12 6.7% 1.76 
50 4.89 50.9% 4.72 49.1% 9.61 
40 6.46 48.5% 6.86 51.5% 13.32 
Optimised 30 4.83 99.0% " 0.05 1.0% 4.88 
30 9.02 39.0% 14.11 61 .0% 23.14 
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From Table 4.2 one obtains a relative perspective of the gains in the risks achieved by 
using an optimsation-based stock proxy rather than a market capitalisation based stock 
proxy. 
It should be noted that the success of the optimisation-based approach does however rely 
on the stability of the covariance structure between the stocks under consideration. In the 
subsequent section we conduct analysis of the out-of-period performance of the optimised 
stock proxy and have contrasted it to the market capitalisation approach. 
4.3.1.6 Results of Optimised Stock Proxy approach "in" an "out-of-period" 
framework 
Estimation of the stock proxy weights within period (Oct 1999 - Sept 
2000) ... 
Scatter Plot of Optimised stock Proxy against General Equity Benchmark 
I 
(within period) 
Beta = 1.01 
Correlation Coefficient = 99.91% 
AnnuaJised TE = 0.93 
.¥ ---._----_ .... . ,_ .. . _--- - - - - ---"\- - -- -_.---- --
a' ·10 -5 
General Equity Benchmatk 
10 
Figure 4.9: Within period results of optimised stock proxy 
Using return data for the first year of the data period, the stock proxy was optimised using 
the top 60 market capitalisation stocks to generate portfolio returns which best replicated 
the benchmark returns during this period (using tracking error as the main criterion). As 
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can be seen in Figure 4.9, the proxy replicates the benchmark very well, with a low 
annualised tracking error of only 0.93. This low tracking error is expected as the 
optimisation is within the period assessed. 
Testing the proxy out-of-period (October 2000 - September 2001) ... 
Monitoring the performance of stock proxy in the subsequent one year period (out-of-
period) yielded a tracking error of 2.08 with a beta of 0.98 (as seen in Figure 4.10 that 
follows). This result demonstrates some degeneration of the stock proxy's ability to 
replicate the benchmark. The test period however consisted of the September market 
crash - increasing the tracking error of most investments because of the increase in the 
volatility in the second period (23.6 compared to the first period volatility of 21.6). From 
this perspective the annualised tracking error of 2.08 thus does not represent excessive 
risk against the benchmark. 
Scatter Plot of OpUmlsed stock Proxy against General Equity Benchmark 
(out of period) 
Beta = 0.98 
Correlation Coefficient = 99.62% 
Annualised TE = 2.08 
I ::it. ---------------,.---------------,-------------a . ·10 -5 5 10 
Gene .. 1 Equity eenchm8J'l( 
Figure 4.10: Out-of-period results of optimised stock proxy 
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Contrasting these results to the equivalent analysis of the market capitalisation approach 
yielded the following tabled summary: 
Table 4.3: Comparative Tracking Errors 
Stock PrO . Construction method 
Optimisation method 





From Table 4.3 it is evident that the optimisation method of stock proxy design yields a 
lower out-ot-period tracking error - supporting our tentative conclusion that the tradeoff 
between risk-matching and stability favours the optimisation approach. The cursory results 
show that the optimised stock proxy remains superior to the market capitalisation-based in 
an "out-ot-period" context. However, one cannot generalize this result, as the results in 
Table 4.3. demonstrate the optimized proxy's superiority over the market capitilisation 
approach for this sample only. 
4.3.1.7 Some practical caveats arising from the construction of market 
capitalisation-based stock proxies 
Benchmarking using market capitalisation-based stock proxies ... 
Our empirical demonstration has highlighted that stock proxies (with a reduced number of 
stocks) tend to have higher betas than their underlying series in the South African 
environment. When stock proxies are used to proxy benchmarks in order to manage the 
risks of portfolios against - the systematic bias in the proxy can lead to systematic errors 
in matching/managing risks of portfolios. 
Indexation using market capitalisation-based stock proxies ... 
A caveat arises when one constructs a market capitalisation-based stock basket with 
fewer stocks than the index it is purported to track. As demonstrated in the empirical 
analysis, the market capitalisation approach can result in the stock proxy having a higher 
beta relative to the index. Hence the proxy is likely to outperform the index in rising market 
and to underperform the index in a declining market - creating unwanted tracking error. 
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Hedging portfolios using market capitalisation-based stock proxies ... 
A further caveat arises when one constructs a market capitalisation-based stock basket 
with fewer stocks than the underlying portfolio for the purposes of hedging the portfolio. As 
highlighted above the market capitalisation approach typically results in the stock proxy 
having a higher beta relative to the underlying portfolio. Hence the proxy is likely to 
outperform the underlying portfolio in rising market and vice versa. As the purpose of a 
hedge is generally to short the stock proxy, clearly this would result in a significant 
shortfall in the hedge position in a rising market and vice versa - highlighting the 
inadequacy of the market capitalisation-based stock proxy construction approach for 
hedging purposes. 
4.3.1.8. Conclusion 
Our empirical demonstration has highlighted that in the South African environment, stock 
proxies (with a reduced number of stocks) tend to have higher betas than their underlying 
series. Consequently, the fewer the number of stocks in the proxy - the higher the betas. 
This problem is particularly relevant where benchmarks are proxied by stock proxies as 
this systematic bias can lead to systematic errors in matching/managing risks of portfolios. 
For indexation application, stock proxies can also result in significant under / out 
performance in volatile markets, thus yielding unacceptably high tracking errors. 
Additionally, for hedging purposes, these stock proxies can result in significant shortfalls in 
the hedge return. 
In ensuing proposals the attention shifts to the case where benchmarks are required to 
accommodate several levels (absolute) to match client profiles. We discuss this 
application with less detail in the subsequent section. 
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4.3.2 A graphical aid to match client profiles to several levels of risk 
(absolute) 
In this section the contribution has been aimed at the trustees who are typically faced with 
the task of understanding the risk characteristics of their fund, and most importantly the 
benchmarks. Most trustees are typically not well versed in the quantitative aspect of 
finance theory and hence the communication in the context of benchmarks needs to be 
simple. 
Our contribution in this section is very modest - the aim is simply to promote I highlight 
the use of simple graphical aids to better understand how portfolio risks can be matched 
to that of differing client risk profiles. 
In contrast to attempting to track the investment performance of a benchmark, the client 
may not be concerned with relative performance of the fund. The objective of the client 
could be "not to lose money", in which case the absolute (total) risk of the fund is vital. 
Clearly, the lower the total risk of the client's fund, the lower the chance of achieving a 
negative return. Conversely, clients may prefer a higher absolute risk for the fund, where a 
larger deviation from the expected return is acceptable. Typically the age profile of 
investors is an important consideration in matching the absolute risk of the benchmark to 
client requirements. 
We once again refer to the scatter plot of returns which graphically display the 
performance of risks of the fund against a benchmark in Figure 4.11. Thus, when 
considering benchmarks with differing levels of absolute risk, we note that absolute risk 
can be viewed in the scatter plot from the left along the y-axis. Absolute risk is calculated 
as the standard deviation of the proposed benchmark's returns. The extent of the 
dispersion along the y-axis represents the absolute risk of the fund, which is a benchmark-
free measure of risk. 
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More specifically, absolute risk is calculated as 
2 
where 0' benchmark 
2 {32 2 2 
0' P = O'benchmark + O'e ... (4.1) 
is the benchmark volatility (as reflected by the dispersion 
along the x-axis), and 
is the residual (unique I diversifiable) risk. 
As seen in equation (4.1), in order to adjust the absolute risk of the proposed benchmark 
to match client profiles, the dominant contribution to the absolute risk of fund is the beta 
coefficient. The beta (as measured through the slope of the regression line) of the 
proposed benchmark relative to the actual benchmark is the primary statistic that needs to 
be changed. This change in beta effectively changes the proposed benchmark's exposure 
to the actual benchmark. 
Clients who have higher aversions to risk (usually older clients) would require more 
downside protection, and thus lower absolute risk. The easiest means of adjusting the 
beta and consequently the absolute risk of the fund would be to use tactical asset 
allocation. This simply implies the changing of the fund's asset allocation to attain a target 
portfolio beta. Thus lowering of market exposure is easily applied by holding more cash 
(as cash typically has a beta of zero). Although holding more cash than the benchmark 
may increase the relative risk of the proposed benchmark (tracking error), this may not be 
of concern to the client, whose primary concern is preservation of capital, i.e. the absolute 
risk. 
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levels of portfolio risk 
The impact on absolute risk as a consequence of altering the portfolio beta is illustrated in 
Figure 4.11. As the beta increases form 0.5 to 1 to 1.5, the absolute risk of the fund 
increases as well according to the formulation in (4.1). Figure 4.11 can be used to 
effectively communicate how the risk profiles (ages) of clients can be accommodated for 
by adjusting the overall portfolio beta. 
In the subsequent section, we discuss the application of constructing a benchmark to 
generate an outperformance against a specified benchmark. 
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4.3.3 A graphical aid for assessing potential outperformance characteristics 
in an investment category 
The aim of any active portfolio manager is to realise positive active return through 
selecting mispriced shares in the market. The ability to 'beat the market' thus lies in the 
ability of the manager (or analyst) to select a portfolio of shares which in combination adds 
value against a benchmark, or has positive alpha. Given a manager has this ability to 
select shares with positive alpha, the important process is transferring this information into 
meaningful input for portfolio design. 
We can transfer these ideas on an "outperformance portfolio" to that of an 
"outperformance bencrmark". It would however seem intuitive that the "outperformance 
benchmark" would have differing sector weights (rather than stock weights) to some 
underlying benchmark. 
For example, some fund managers in South Africa have constructed envisaged 
"outperformance benchmarks" by down weighting the Resource sector in the ALSI. 
Typical down weighted benchmarks have splits of 80% Financials & Industrials (FINDI) 
and 20% Resources (RESI), whereas the ALSI split would currently average around 60% 
FINDI and 40% RESI. The implicit expectation in this outperformance benchmark is 
clearly that the FINDI would outperform the RESI in the foreseen future. In this way, the 
fund managers hope that such an outperformance benchmark would yield an alpha 
against the ALSI. 
Our objective is once again very modest - we simply aim to highlight how an 
outperformance benchmark can be assessed in a simple graphical framework. We focus 
on the outperformance as reflected in the alpha (in much the same way as for alpha for 
individual stocks). 













with positive alpha and Beta = 1 
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Graphically, the alpha is the value at the point of intersection of the outperformance 
benchmark against the actual benchmark. As can be seen in Figure 4.12, the portfolio 
contains positive alpha and the beta is equal to one. 
Besides the fact that this outperformance benchmark must contain some alpha, there 
exist important risk management factors to consider in the portfolio design. When 'chasing 
alpha', it is vital to ensure the risk taken (tracking error) is taken up largely by selection 
risk, and not timing risk. Managers thus must ensure that the beta of the outperformance 
benchmark relative to the actual benchmark is as close to one as possible to avoid 
unwanted timing risk against the actual benchmark. In a later chapter we will motivate why 
selection risk is preferred to timing risk, as well as provide recommended beta ranges for 
which to keep portfolio betas within to avoid significant timing risk. 
The proposal in this section is that a fund manager aims to achieve these statistics for the 
outperformance benchmark. 
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4.4. Estimating Peer Benchmarks 
4.4.1. Introduction and discussion 
It is often important for risk management purposes to ensure the portfolio manager 
considers the expected tracking error of the portfolio relative to the peergroup benchmark, 
due to the fact that it encompasses the current active risk of the portfolio. Or more loosely 
speaking, managers often prefer to manage the risk of under performing their peers given 
the current holdings of the fund - rather than the historical returns. Compositions of peer 
funds are often not publicly available however, especially in the pension fund industry. 
The central focus in this section therefore will be on quantitative techniques to estimate 
the major sector holdings of peers via their returns. 
We recall that the computation of expected tracking error requires a covariance matrix of 
returns of the shares in the portfolio and the benchmark as well as the current relative 
compositions between the portfolio and benchmark. One practical problem is that current 
compositions held by peer benchmarks are not always widely known. Whilst 
compositional data is available only quarterly in the Unit Trust industry, publicly available 
pension fund data is even scarcer. It is often a necessity therefore to estimate the actual 
compositions through examining the relationship of returns of the benchmark and the 
observed returns of the assets that the benchmark holds. 
Sharpe (1988) pioneered a procedure using constrained regression analysis to form 
inferences on the influences and compositions of portfolios, based soley on the historical 
returns of the portfolio. This approach has been used by practitioners attempting to 
establish the compositions of portfolios or benchmarks for which no composition data is 
available. This methodology later led to the work by Sharpe (1992) on style analysis. 
Sharpe's constrained regression analysis was based on a factor model in the following 
form: 
n 
R' =b' + "b' F' po L..Jkk 
k=l 
where: R~ = return series of portfolio at time period t 
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F: = return series of factor k 
b; = sensitivity of portfolio returns to factor k 
b; = time series of portfolio residual returns 
In the context of estimating compositions, we use market or sector indices (e.g. Financial 
Index, Industrial Index or Resource Index) instead of factors. We thus interpret the 
coefficients of the regression as the sensitivities of the portfolio returns to the factor i (or 
in our case sector index I). 
The regression approach however can yield outputs that can be unintuitive to 
practitioners, as the coefficients could have negative values (implying un intuitive negative 
sensitivity or negative weighting) and the independent variables could additionally suffer 
from multicollinearity problems (if any market indices are highly correlated). Further 
concerns relating to using regression analysis for estimating index sensitivities are 
outlined by Christopherson (1995) and Trzcinka (1995). 
Sharpe's standard constraints placed on the regression to facilitate intuitive interpretation 
are 
These constraints assist the problem of multicollinearity, and allow the resultant 
sensitivities to sector indices as proxies for weights of the portfolio in the specified sector. 
However, given the constraints of the coefficients, the estimation of the regression no 
longer uses the traditional estimation method of least squares, but rather a technique of 
quadratic programming. 
Underlying assumptions •.. 
The underlying assumption in the regression requires that the returns of the portfolio 
attributed to each sector are commensurate of the actual returns of that sector. Stock 
selection within a sector could cause an element of mismatching of return, however if an 
aggregated peer group benchmark is used, stock selection would be minimized due to the 
diversification effect. Another assumption requires that the weights of the portfolio be 
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constant for the period of analysis. Results can consequently only be interpreted as 
average estimated weights over the period of analysis. 
Lobosco and DiBartholomeo (1997) proposed the use of confidence intervals for 
estimating the weights when using Sharpe's constrained regression. The standard 
deviation of estimates is thus: 
(J -In-k-l B, 
where: 
(J a = standard error of regression analysis 
(J B, = unexplained sector volatility 
n = number of returns used in the regression analysis, and 
k = number of sector indices with non-zero regression coefficient weights. 
The derivation of the formula can be found in Appendix 4A at the end of Chapter 4. As 
expected, the standard deviation of the weight estimated increases with the standard error 
of the regression analysis. Additionally they decrease with the number of returns used in 
the regression analysis and also decrease with the unexplained sector volatility. 
The aim of multiple linear regression analysis is to minimise the squared errors between 
the portfolio returns and a portfolio of weighted sector returns, in the form of: 
n 
Minimise L)Rt -bo -blFil -b2F:2 - ... -bn_1F:.n_I)2 
i=\ 
n 
Noting that bo + Ibk Fk is equivalent to the return of the estimated sector weighted 
k=1 
portfolio, the regression reduces to 
n 
Minimise ICRt - Rio)2 
i=\ 
where Rio is the portfolio returns of the estimated weighted sector index which best 
represents the actual portfolio returns. This formulation is thus consistent with the 
objective of minimsing the tracking error between the two series. 
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4.4.2 Empirical analysis 
The objective of the ensuing analysis is to estimate the benchmark composition of the 
Financial and Industrial Index (FINDI) and Resources (RESI) Index held by the aggregate 
of fund managers in the Alexander Forbes Top 10 Pension Fund category (henceforth 
referred to as the implicit benchmark). We use the "equity only' component of monthly 
returns in the analysis for the period January 1998 to December 2001 for this purpose. To 
assess the dynamics of the estimated components of the benchmark through time, we 
employ a rolling period analysis, whereby a period of 12 months is analysed and rolled 
forward month by month. We also further decompose the FINDI Index into the Financial 
Index and Industrial Index in order to establish a more accurate estimate of the FINDI -
RESI mix. Peergroup benchmarks based on both the median and the mean Top 10 
Manager fund returns in each month are also considered. 
4.4.2.1 Results using Peer Median 
Because of the small sample size of the AFLMW (10 funds), an "outlying" fund like ALLAN 
GRAY could potentially influence the mean fund return but would have no impact on the 
median fund return. We therefore implemented the iterative methodology described above 
to estimate the median peergroup holding using one-year rolling estimation periods. A 
graphical summary of the results is shown in Figure 4.13. 
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Figure 4.14: FINDI-Resources weights resulting in minimum Tracking Error for 
Median Top 10 Pension funds. 
The results reveal that the median fund held between 80% to 88% in the FINDlindex up to 
the July 2000, thereafter a FINDI weighting fractionally smaller than 80% was apparent. A 
dip in the FINDI around July 2000 occurred, which is suspected to be an unreliable 
estimate due to the drastic change. 
In an attempt to improve the analysis we include the Financial and Industrial Indices as 
separate components in the FINDI. The argument is that the additional split into Financials 
and Industrials, may well result in a lower tracking error generated using 3 assets instead 
of 2. Whilst we may not be interested in this level of detail, the additional impact on the 
correlation structure may be important in ascertaining a more accurate overriding FINDI-
Resources mix. 
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Figure 4.15: Resulting weights considering three indices 
It is evident from Figure 4.15 that the overriding FINDI-Resources mix is more stable when 
the additional decomposition of the FINDI is taken into consideration. This is likely to be a 
more intuitive result. By comparing the Resource weights for July 2000 in Figures 4.14 and 
Figure 4.15 it is thus most likely that the more accurate result is found in Figure 4.15. 
4.4.2.2 Analysis using Peer Mean 
Note that the mean fund return in essence uses information from all 10 pension fund 
returns in each month. Recall however that an "outlying" fund like ALLAN GRAY could 
potentially influence the mean fund return but would have no impact on the median fund 
return. 
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Figure 4.16: FINDI-Resources weights resulting in minimum Tracking Error for 
Mean Top 10 Pension funds. 
Contrasting Figures 4.16 and 4.17 it is evident that Figure 4.17 depicts slightly less volatile 
FINDI-Resource mixes than the 2-index analysis in Figure 4.16. This suggests that the 3-
index approach does yield a more reliable result. More importantly, contrasting the results 
of the analysis using the median versus the mean (in Figures 4.15 and 4.17 respectively), 
it is evident that prior to August 2000 the results of the median analysis (Figure 4.15) 
yielded a marginally smaller weight in Resources than the analysis using the mean fund 
return (Figure 4.17). This influence may be due to an outlying fund such as ALLAN GRAY 
having a significantly larger relative weight in Resources over this period - impacting on 
the analysis using the mean fund return. Subsequent to August 2000 however there is no 
significant difference in the weights found using the median and mean fund return. 
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Figure 4.17: Resulting weights considering three indices - analysis using peer mean. 
Table 4.4 below gives a quantitative summary of the investment weights in the 
corresponding sectors of Figures 4.14 through to 4.17. The average minimum tracking 
error for this procedure was 2.86, compared to the initial approach of using the Peer 
median with 2-indices with an average minimum tracking error of 3.54. The investment 
weights are also most stable, with the lowest standard deviation of 1.40. It is clear that the 
most successful estimation approach for benchmark weights occurs when one uses the 
Peer Mean with 3 indices. 
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Table 4.4: Summary of estimated composition of Peer Benchmarks 
Peer Median Peer Mean 
2 index 3 index 2 index 3 index 
FINDI Resources FINDI Resources FINDI Resources FINDI Resources 
Dec-98 84.26 1·5.74 81.78 18.22 77.26 22.74 76.40 23.60 
Jan-99 84.46 15.54 84.09 15.91 78.65 21.35 79.72 20.28 
Feb-99 86.04 13.96 84.35 15.65 79.50 20.50 79.43 20.57 
Mar-99 85.97 14.03 84.20 15.80 79.37 20.63 80.02 19.98 
Apr-99 85.88 14.12 85.34 14.66 79.52 20.48 79.50 20.50 
May-99 87.34 I 12.66 86.74 13.26 80.50 19~50 80.67 19;33 
Jun-99 88.04 11.96 87.25 .12.75 81 .62 18.38 81.39 18.61 
Jul-99 87.68 12.32 87.14 12.86 81 .52 18.48 81.43 18.57 
Aug-99 85.38 14.62 85.59 14.41 79.87 20.13 79.75 20.25 
Sep-99 85.64 14.36 85.90 14.10 80.48 19.52 80.72 19.28 
Oct-99 86.28 13.72 87.47 12.53 82.48 17.52 82.98 17.02 
Nov-99 86.34 13SS 87.65 12.35 82.34 17.66 82.98 17.02 
Dec-99 86.92 13.08 87.67 12.33 82.48 17.52 82.90 17.10 
Jan-OO 84.72 15.28 85.38 14.62 81.48 18.52 81.84 18.16 
Feb-OO 83.15 16.85 84.80 15.20 80.05 19.95 81 .02 18.98 
Mar-OO 83.35 16.65 84.61 15,39 80.23 119.n 81.21 18.79 
Apr-OO 86.02 13.98 83.05 16.95 81 .72 18.28 80.91 19.09 
May-OO 81.82 18.18 82.79 17.21 80.61 19.39 81.27 18.73 
Jun-OO 81.15 18.85 , 82.24 11.76 80.33 19;67 80.87 19.13 
Jul-OO 66.36 33.64 81.99 18.01 77.57 22.43 81 .90 18.10 
Aug-OO 74.65 25.35 79.53 20.47 74.65 25.35 80.56 1:9:44 
Sep-OO 81.52 18.48 80.41 19.59 81 .52 18.48 81.70 18.30 
Oct-OO 79.12 20.88 80.15 19;85 80.35 19.65 81.01 18.99 
Nov-OO 78.78 21.22 79.93 
,. 
20.07 80.01 19.99 80.85 19.15 
Dec-OO 77.02 22.98 , 77.90 22.10 78.41 21 .59 79.03 20.97 
Std Dev 4.92 2.84 1.81 1.40 
Average Min TE 3.54 3.38 2.93 2.86 
4.4.2.3 Reliability of results 
In order to give some inSights on the reliability of our results, we have documented the 
minimum tracking error that was obtained, and plotted it alongside the resulting FINDI-
Resources weights obtained at these minimum levels of tracking error at each point in 
time. These tracking errors are displayed in Figure 4.18 for the median analysis (from 
Figure 4.15) along with the estimate weights. 
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Figure 4.18: Minimum tracking errors and corresponding FINDI-Resources mixes 
through time using Median fund returns 
The minimum tracking error series in Figures 4.18 is seen to be larger up until August 
1999 as a consequence of the volatility in fund returns caused by the August 1998 crash. 
Thereafter the August 1998 returns are rolled out of the estimation period, resulting in 
significantly lower tracking errors, and consequently more reliability in the estimation 
process. 
4.4.2.4 Conclusion 
The objective in this section was to suggest a practical approach for estimating the major 
sector holdings of an aggregate peer benchmark. Our motivation is that in many 
circumstances only the returns of the benchmark is publicly available - and compositions 
are not known. 
In this section we have thus proposed using an approach of minimising tracking error, and 
found it yielded a useful guide for the estimation of the major sector compositions held by 
the peer benchmark. 
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4.5. Outperforming benchmarks using Sector Allocation 
Outperforming a pre-specified benchmark is the fundamental goal of any active manager. 
In order to generate outperformance however, active managers need to separate and add 
value in two distinct processes. The first concerns finding superior information to aid 
forecast ability, with the second process involving the efficient translation of this 
information into the construction of portfolio. Practically, beating a benchmark thus 
requires the aspects of both skill and aggression. Thus, it is evident that it is insufficient for 
active managers to only possess a certain level of skill , as the ability to apply the skill and 
take active positions against the benchmark is of equal importance. 
In this section we consider the potential for an active manager to outperform a pre-
specified benchmark through allocation between major sectors on the JSE, namely the 
Financial & Industrial Index and the Resources Index. We impose various levels of skill 
and aggression to demonstrate the separate impacts these processes have on both the 
risk and return of the active manager. 
4.5.1 Review 
Prior studies on outperforming benchmarks (which have typically been broad market 
indices) have concentrated on whether active managers have on average outperformed 
an aggregate benchmark, and whether this outperformance has been due to luck or skill. 
Early studies have shown that on average, mutual funds have underperformed their 
benchmarks on a risk-adjusted basis. Ippolito (1993) found that performance of the 
average fund in the U.S.A was statistically indistinguishable from the S&P 500 index, 
whereas Malkiel (1995) found that when taking into account survivourship bias, the 
average U.S.A equity manager significantly underperformed the S&P 500 index for the 
period 1981 to 1991. Other studies2 have found similar results of no evidence for the 
average active manager producing exceptional returns. 
2 See Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Werners (1997). 
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Fortunately, this says nothing about the potential for successful active portfolio 
management. Marcus (1990) found that top performing mutual funds exhibited statistically 
significantly positive relative performance, given the large number of funds in the study. 
Fox (1999) ran simulations to assess the ability of U.S. active managers (using data from 
1980 to 1995) to outperform a pre-specified benchmark by using tactical asset allocation. 
According to Fox, the extent of relative performance relied on two factors: forecast abilities 
and the size of the tilts away from the benchmark mix. He found that a surprisingly little 
amount of forecasting ability is needed for a U.S. tactical asset allocation manager to 
provide an attractive return in excess of the benchmark. 
4.5.2 Empirical Analysis 
Our empirical analysis is thus based on simulations of active equity managers taking 
sector allocation bets between the Financial & Industrial Index (FINDI) and the Resources 
Index (RESI) based on historical monthly returns during the period January 1995 to 
October 2000. To generalise our results, our study design is not reliant on the exact 
choice of weights in the benchmark. In other words, whether the benchmark choice is 80 : 
20 (FINDI : RESI) or 50 : 50 is not material. 
We thus run simulations based on active equity managers performing sector allocation 
between the Financial and Industrial Index (FINDI) and the Resources Index (RESI) 
based on historical monthly returns during the period January 1995 to October 2001 . The 
manager is compared to a combination of the two sectors, namely a benchmark of 70% 
FINDI and 30% RESI. Thus, the difference between the active manager's portfolio returns 
and the benchmark is solely due to the choice of sector weights in the portfolio. 
4.5.2.1 Methodology 
The skill level of managers and their ability to correctly forecast the best performing sector 
in a particular month, is reflected in the average proportion of correct choices they make 
over the time period. For each simulation, a relative return and tracking error is calculated 
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and recorded. We repeat these simulations five thousand times for each scenario of 
forecasting ability and tilt size, in order to assess the distribution of relative returns and 
active risks taken. 
4.5.2.2. Forecasting ability 
To assess the relationship between the forecasting ability and relative returns, we fix the 
tilt sizes from the benchmark, and assess relative returns at forecasting abilities of 50%, 
60%, 70%, 80% and 90% over the time period 1995 to 2000. In Figure 4.19 we show the 
median relative return for fixed 5% tilt sizes. We also plot the upper and lower quartile and 
maximum and minimum relative return in order to assess the distribution of relative 
returns for various forecasting abilities. 
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Figure 4.19: Annualised Relative Return with 5% tilt sizes 
Figure 4.19 illustrates the relative return quartile distribution for each level of forecasting 
ability, with the inner two shaded bars representing the 2nd and 3rd quartiles of relative 
return. The outer lightly shaded bars represent the 1 st and 4th quartiles. It is clear that a 
manager with 50% (random) forecasting ability will have an expected outperformance 
relative to the benchmark of zero. Clearly, a 50% forecasting ability in essence embodies 
no skill. It is also clear that as the forecasting ability increases, the median relative return 
increases almost linearly. However the dispersion of relative returns (as measured by the 
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inter-quartile range) decreases with increasing forecasting ability. A possible interpretation 
for these results is that the higher the skill of managers, the more certain or predictable 
the attainment the relative return. This suggests with higher levels of skill we are more 
assured of obtaining the outperformance average. 
We consider the comparable results in Figure 4.20 where a manager is more aggressive 
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Figure 4.20: Annualised Relative Return with 10% Tilt sizes 
As seen in Figure 4.20, the relationship between the median relative return for each level 
of forecasting ability remains linear with 10% tilt sizes. However, the dispersion of relative 
returns is wider. The same characteristic of decreasing ranges of relative returns with 
increasing forecasting ability is seen with 10% tilt sizes, as well as a tendency for 
increasing positive skewness with forecasting ability. 
To confirm the decreasing dispersion of relative returns with forecasting ability, we now 
plot the tracking error for both 5% and 10% tilt sizes for each level of forecasting ability. 
This result is shown in Figure 4.21. 
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!An;ualiled Tracking E~or against Benchmark I 
• 1 0% Tilt size 




Figure 4.21: Annualised Tracking Error with 10% and 5% Tilt sizes 
It is thus clear that as managers exhibit more skill in their ability to forecast the correct 
asset (above 50%), two positive consequences arise. The first obvious one is that the 
median outperformance attainable against the benchmark increases. The second 
consequence is that the certainty of the positive relative return also increases. 
4.5.2.3 Aggression 
We now consider the dynamics of these results as the degree of tilt sizes change. Since 
aggression is implicit in the tilt sizes managers take on, this aggression is captured by the 
tracking error against the benchmark. For the purposes of assessing the impact of 
changing aggression, we consider forecasting ability of 60% and 70% only. Figure 4.22 
shows the results for a forecasting ability of 60%. 
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-9% 10% 
Figure 4.22: Annualised Relative Return with 60% forecasting ability sizes 
As can be seen in Figure 4.22, the increase in bet sizes results in the increase in the 
median outperformance for the manager who has 60% forecasting ability. At face value, 
this result suggests the managers with 60% skill should take on more risk by increasing 
their tilt sizes. 
Unfortunately, and intuitively, the dispersion of relative returns also increases with tilt 
sizes. This also suggests that the risk of obtaining the outperformance also increases. A 
further implication is that managers with 60% skill should only not take on higher tilt sizes 
where the risk of underperformance is acceptable. Table 4.5 presents the relevant 
summary statistics on the relative performance for managers with 60% forecasting ability. 
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Table 4.5: Performance ·;tatistics for managers with 60% forecasting ability 
Tilt sizes Average Minimum Lower Median Lower Maximum Prob(underperforming 
Quartile Quarble Benchmark) 
1% 0.17 -0.32 0.08 0.17 0.25 0.57 8.6% 
2% 0.33 -0.52 0.16 0.34 0.51 1.09 8.8% 
3% 0.50 -0.74 0.25 0.50 0.76 1.78 8.4% 
4% 0.66 -1.30 0.33 0.68 1.00 2.34 9.3% 
5% 0.83 -1.59 0.41 0.84 1.25 2.87 9.5% 
6% 0.99 -2.11 0.49 1.00 1.52 3.43 9.7% 
7% 1.19 -2.31 0.59 1.21 1.81 3.89 9.6% 
8% 1.36 -2.39 0.67 1.38 2.07 4.92 9.8% 
9% 1.48 -2.48 0.73 1.50 2.28 5.44 9.7% 
10% 1.67 -2.55 0.82 1.70 2.50 5.85 9.9% 
Similar results for managers with 70% forecasting ability are given in Table 4.6 below. 
Table 4.6: Performance statistics for managers with 70% forecasting ability 
Tilt sizes Average Mi1imum. Lower Median Lower Maximum .Prob{underperfom1ing ' 
Quartile Quartile Benchmark) 
1% 0.33 -0.21 0.26 0.34 0.42 0.70 0.4% 
2% 0.67 -0.29 0.52 0.68 0.84 1.37 0.2% 
3% 1.01 -0.26 0.78 1.02 1.25 2.09 0.3% 
4% 1.34 -0.34 1.03 1.36 1.67 2.93 0.3% 
5% 1.69 -0.41 1.30 1.71 2.08 3.41 0.2% 
6% 2.02 -0.46 1.57 2.04 2.52 4.30 0.4% 
7% 2.35 -0.54 1.79 2.39 2.93 5.26 0.3% 
8% 2.69 -0.61 2.06 2.71 3.36 5.61 0.3% 
9% 3.09 -0.69 2.38 3.11 3.82 6.65 0.3% 
10% 3.43 -0.76 2.67 3.46 4.23 7.52 0.2% 
Interestingly, the probability of underperforming the benchmark does not increase quickly 
when increasing the size of tilts. For managers with more skill (70% or more), the 
probability of underperforming the benchmark becomes negligible. This result is important, 
as it implies managers with significant skill can enhance the relative return without 
compromising the probability of underperformance. The result thus points towards 
managers with more than 70% forecasting ability to take on bigger tilt sizes. 
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4.5.3 Conclusion 
Two important results based on simulating the probabilities of relative performance given 
various levels of skill and tilt sizes in the context of major sector selection emerge. The 
first is that the increase in a manager's ability of forecasting leads not only to the increase 
of expected relative return, but the dispersion of expected relative return would be smaller. 
The second is that once a manager has significant forecasting ability (70% or more), the 
payoffs of increasing the tilt sizes are not compromised by the probability of 
underperforming. 
r' 
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Appendix4A 
Approximating the confidence intervals for Sharpe's style weights [Lobsco and 
DiBartholomeo (1997)] 
Following Lobsco and DiBartholomeo (LD, 1997), we define the return series for the true style 
weight combination of sector indices as 
s= ~ w·r.· L..Jll, 
where Wi = 
= 
LD also define 
A=R 8, 
where R = 
... (A1) 
the true style weight of index ;, and 
the time series of returns on index ;. 
... (A2) 
the time series of returns to the subject portfolio 
Series A can be thought of as the residual term of the constrained regression. The extent to which 
the estimated style weights do not match the true style weights is defined as: 
where OJi 




the estimate of the true style weight for index ;, and 
the amount of error in the estimate of style weight for index i. 
The fitting process isolates the portion of the market indexes' returns that are independent of the 
market indexes used in the style analysis. To isolate the independent portion of each index, LD 
define 
and 
LVm 1 (for m=f:.i) , 





returns on the Sharpe style index for market index; analysed 
against all market indexes exclusive of i, 
style weight on index m, 
returns on market index m. 
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In defining the extent to which one market index is a linear combination of the others, the 
intuitiveness of the explanation is no longer necessary. LD thus removed the constraint that the 
style weights must be in the range of 0 to 1. LD then define 
B- =r· - T-I I I , 
where Bj = 
... (A6) 
portion of the returns on index i not attributable to the other market 
indexes, subject to the other market indexes, subject to the 
constraint (A5). 
Given that we've got the error terms for both the style weights ( .ilwi ) and the independent portions 
of the market index behaviours ( B j ). It can be shown that the operative process in style analysis is 
to try to minimse the variance of R - S - (AwjBj ) or A - (.ilwjBj). LD thus set an objective 
function, Z, to this expression: 
Z var(A .ilw;B;) 
222 
:::::: a A + L\w; aB
I 
... (A7) 
To solve for the minimum of the variance, LD set the derivatives of the variance with respect to the 
style weights equal to zero. 
. .. (AB) 
Since the standard deviation for p is approximately 1/.J n - 2 ,the standard deviation of Wi is 
approximated by 
atJ.w/ == a A /(aB/.Jn - 2) 
where n is the number of data paints in the return series. 
To solve for a A , we have to know a a , where 
a R- ~)Wi +tJ.Wt)rt 
... (A9) 
... (A10) 
Since a has (n k) degrees of freedom and A has (n 1) degrees of freedom, LD then used the 
relation 












Chapter 4: Benchmarking 
... (A11) 
where k = number of market indexes with non-zero style weights. 
Rearranging (A11) and substituting back into (A9), LD arrived at 
... (A 12) 
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SOME CONTRIBUTIONS TO RISK MANAGEMENT 
FOR ACTIVE MANAGERS 
5.1 Overview 
Active portfolio managers have significant uncertainty to contend with, and thus employ 
portfolio risk management processes. The popularity of risk management processes is 
growing, with new paradigms and models emerging relating to the forecasting, estimating 
and managing of portfolio risk (see "Global Risk Management: Are We Missing the Point?" 
Richard Bookstaber, Journal of Portfolio Management, Institutional Investor Spring 1997) 
However, portfolio risk management can be examined within two frameworks, namely 
absolute and relative. Trustees are concerned about absolute risk (the volatility of 
absolute returns) and would want to ensure increased certainty of returns through low 
volatility of absolute returns. Managers however are often not concerned with absolute 
returns, as their monitoring has become focused on relative returns of funds in their 
respective investment industry I category. This risk of achieving relative return is referred 
to as tracking error, as defined in Section 2.3.3. Another term used frequently is manager 
risk. Tracking error captures the risk the manager takes through active bets against the 
benchmark in an attempt to outperform it. The terms tracking error, active risk and 
manager risk are thus used interchangeably in this thesis. 
The increased cognisance of relative performance of fund managers has led them to 
employ active risk management processes to avoid severe underperformance, yet at the 
same time to also achieve a moderate level of outperformance. To this end, significant 
emphasis of this section will lie on active risk management. 
As a result of its popularity, active risk management is winning the favour of a number of 
influential proponents in the academic, pension fund consulting and asset management 
worlds. Bob Litterman, co-author with the late Fischer Black of an influential 1992 paper 
on a quantitative approach to asset allocation, describes himself as a "big fan" of active 
risk management. Says Litterman, now head of quantitative resources at Goldman Sachs 
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where risk management comes into its own. It says that the way to approach the problem 
is to maximize the return at the margin for each risk allocation within the overall budget." 3 
Structure of Chapter •.. 
When one considers the importance of a measure such as tracking error in actively 
managing portfolios, a few aspects regarding tracking error and consequently portfolio risk 
management have to be considered. This chapter deals with several of these aspects in 
the context of the South African fund manager. The chapter is thus separated into the 
following sections: 
5.2. Managing expected rather than historical active risk 
5.3. Setting tracking error mandates 
5.4. Active Risk taking habit of consistent top performers 
This chapter will further examine each of these topics on tracking error in detail, providing 
a background to previous literature on each issue. Additionally, an empirical analysis will 
be conducted where necessary with the objectives of gaining insights for active managers 
in managing their portfolio risk against their benchmark. Whilst the above topics by no 
means exhaust the topic of active risk, they are intended to cover some of the important 
research areas having current practical relevance. The first consideration, which follows, 
is that the expected tracking error encompasses current conditions of active risk. 
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5.2 Managing Expected rather than Historical Risks 
Historical tracking error (as calculated through historical returns) has often been used by 
practitioners as a measure of manager risk. This measure however encapsulates the 
average deviation from the benchmark over a historical period of time (often 12 months). 
The problem with the historical tracking error measure is that it does not convey the 
current risk against the benchmark, as reflected by the current holdings of the portfolio. 
This problem was confirmed by Kahn (1997), who found that the use of risk management 
models in active portfOliO management improved the prediction of actual risk, and 
proposed the use of portfolio-based forecasts (based on current holdings of the portfolio) 
to that of historical risk estimates (based on historical returns). Dimson and Jackson 
(2001) also show that when implementing a risk management process, the longer the 
period of risk measurement, the lower the probability of observing extreme observations. 
The measure which best captures the current manager risk is known as 'expected 
tracking error', which uses the contemporaneous relative weights and the covariance 
structure of the assets in order to assess the expected level of manager risk currently 
being taken against the benchmark. This measure of expected tracking error thus reflects 
the manager risk of the portfOlio against the benchmark given that the current relative 
weights against the benchmark are held over the entire assessment period. We thus 








weights vector for portfolio at time t 
weights vector for benchmark at time t 
covariance matrix of returns of stocks held in portfolio and 
benchmark 
... (3.1) 
An important advantage of this measure is its ability to dynamically capture the managers 
impact on tracking error given conjectured changes in the bet sizes against the 
benchmark. The expected tracking error then reflects the antiCipated tracking error going 
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The reliance on this assumption is needed for the use of expected (forecasted) tracking 
error. In reality, forecast tracking error will not exactly equal actual tracking error. Gardner 
and Bowie (2000) cite the following five factors as major contributors to the estimation 
error between forecasted tracking and actual tracking error: 
• Significant fluctuations in market volatility 
• Unanticipated changes in specific risk 
• The presence of autocorrelation 
• Extreme market movements 
• The emergence of new market trends and themes 
It has however been documented that expected tracking error consistently has a 
downward bias relative to historical tracking error. Hwang and Satchell (2001), as well as 
Gardner and Bowie (2000) show that ex-ante (expected) and ex-post (historical) tracking 
errors necessarily differ. In particular, ex-post tracking error is always larger due to the 
stochastic nature of portfolio and benchmark weights in the period of calculation. They 
thus conclude that ex-post tracking error (historical) is not suitable to active managers, as 
it creates the perception that significantly more active risk is being taken. 
The next section considers the subject of setting the amount of active risk taken in the 
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5.3 Setting Tracking Error mandates 
5.3.1. Introduction and background 
The focus on active risk through the measure of tracking error has been at the centre of 
the transition of the investment management industry to a more risk-controlled 
environment [Gardener and Bowie (2000)]. The use of tracking error has been largely 
utilised as a control measure of fund managers to restrain relative investment 
performance, as well as being utilised by trustees as part of the manager selection and 
evaluation process. 
Trustees additionally set tracking error mandates to limit the active risk of fund managers 
against their specified benchmark. These mandates are typically put in place in order for 
managers to constrain the fund manager's tracking error against their benchmark, 
naturally avoiding severe underperformance. However, the cost of curtailing active risk is 
also the forgoing of potential outperformance. Along with a tracking error mandate, 
trustees would prescribe a minimum relative performance target against their specified 
benchmark. This target would typically manifest in the form of a ranking objective i.e. 
attaining 1 st quartile and I or avoiding 4th quartile. 
The rationale for restraining a fund's active risk against the benchmark is related to the 
increasing awareness of relative fund performance in the investment industry. Investor's 
have become weary about relative performance, and this concern has led fund managers 
to curtailing tracking errors to avoid severe underperformance. 
Few studies however have considered appropriate levels of tracking error for active 
managers. Most studies have concentrated on maXimising expected return for a given 
level of tracking error [see Larsen and Resnick (1998), and Baierl and Chen (2000)]. 
Furthermore, the most commonly documented control for active managers has been 
restraining the bet sizes against the benchmark for each share, sector or asset class. 
Ammann and Zimmerman (2000) found that imposing active asset allocation bet sizes on 
fund managers did not adequately restrict active risk, and thus recommended the use of 
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Institutions and pension fund consultants have however begun considering limiting 
tracking error. At ABP (an international risk management consultant), the risk 
management process has permitted a 2 percent tracking error to the benchmark for active 
managers and will maintain those allocations within a couple of percentage points and 
rebalance its mix to keep them relatively constant. Beyond that, ABP has also set a 
tracking error limit for the sector allocation within each of the asset classes.4 
PGGM (an international asset management company) are applying risk management to 
asset classes, and have set a target tracking error for an investment class, such as global 
fixed income, and measure that against a standard investment benchmark, such as the 
J.P. Morgan government bond index.5 
In the ensuing section we perform an empirical analysis so as to review a framework for 
establishing appropriate active risk parameters (in the form of tracking errors) for 
investment categories in the South African context. We note that it is imperative that the 
feasibility of these tracking error mandates be researched empirically to ascertain the 
likelihood of attaining the specified relative performance objectives of the fund. 
In setting tracking error limits for active fund management, a typical first objective would 
be to avoid ending up in the 4th quartile of fund performance. A conceptual debate for the 
tracking error limit to avoid 4th quartile performance would be the median of the 
competitor's tracking errors. The argument is that, given a one-to-one relationship 
between active risk and active return, if a fund takes moderate active risk, the fund would 
be likely to generate moderate relative performance, i.e. end up in either the 2nd or 3rd 
quartile. These moderate active risk-taking funds are most likely to have taken less than 
the median tracking error. The other half of funds that take on more than median tracking 
error are more likely to fall into the 1 st or 4th quartile of fund performance. This is based on 
the premise that the more active risk a fund takes the higher the fund's chances of out-
and under-performing the benchmark would be. However, this premise may not always 
hold true in practice. 
4 Website: http://www.ausbus.com/management.htm#riskman 
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To illustrate this point, Figure 5.1 plots the annualised tracking errors and relative returns 
for each individual year from 1995 to 2001. The benchmark used is the peer mean, which 
is calculated by averaging the returns of the competitors for each month. The fact that 
distinct years are being used is based on the assumption that performance of a fund in 
one year is independent from it's performance in the following year. It is thus clear that in 
Figure 5.1. there exist funds which take on relatively low active risk and severely 
underperform, as well as fund which take on high active risk and attain little active return. 
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Using this conceptual debate, one could argue that should a fund aim to avoid the 4th 
quartile fund performance, the fund should maintain a tracking error less than the median 
of tracking errors in the peergroup. However, the expense of sacrificing the possibility of 
achieving 1 st quartile performance also has to be considered in conjunction with avoiding 
underperformance. Thus it is imperative to assess the trade-off between avoiding 
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In the next section, an empirical analysis is presented so as to investigate the trade-offs of 
avoiding underperformance and forsaking outperformance at different tracking error 
levels. 
5.3.2 Methodology 
Once again, Figure 5.2 illustrates the relative performances of funds are displayed for 
various levels of tracking error taken. The median annualised tracking error for the set of 
funds is calculated to be 4.5%. The clear configuration suggests that funds with highest 
tracking errors have either achieved the highest or lowest relative return. Conversely, the 
cross-sectional dispersion of relative returns for those funds that took on low tracking 
errors is fairly low. The implication is thus that funds taking low tracking errors would thus 
typically forgo performance in the upper quartile, but at the benefit of avoiding 4th quartile 
performance. 
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Given the upper and lower quartile of returns, it is clear in Figure 5.2 that the majority of 
funds that have fallen outside these bounds have taken on larger then median tracking 
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performance while remaining under median tracking error is fairly low (at approximately 
13% in this example). However, a 13% chance of underperforming while remaining within 
the median tracking error cannot be guaranteed given the sample size is only 122 funds in 
this example. 
Due to the limited number of Unit Trusts available in each investment category, accurate 
estimates of reliable probabilities of out- and underperformance are restricted. The 
unreliability lies in the fact that the number of observations is not enough to make 
dependable estimates based on this methodology. One needs to make use of a large 
enough sample size that attempts to represent all possible combinations of relative return 
and tracking error achievable. A re-sampling method is needed to generate sufficient fund 
performance data in order to improve the estimates of out and under-performance 
probabilities in a non-biasing and theoretically rigorous approach. 
Bootstrapping is thus used to recreate a fund's return series through randomly re-
sampling data points from the actual fund's time series data. These recreated hypothetical 
funds are then used to re-compute the relative return and tracking errors from the newly 
created time series against the corresponding benchmark returns series. This re-sampling 
procedure is repeated one thousand times to ensure reliable approximation of the 
relationship between relative returns attainable for each level of tracking error. In order to 
achieve reliability around low tracking error areas where the sample size may be small, 
different combinations of the benchmark and active funds are re-sampled. 
The bootstrapping approach does require the assumption that the performance of a fund 
is independent from one month to the other, which allows one to sample within the actual 
fund's return series. This assumption is based on the assertion that the market is efficient 
and that fund returns are time-variant independent. The disadvantage of this approach is 
that it does not preserve the sequential integrity of the data, yet a suggestion for future 
research would be to bootstrap sequences of data. This re-sampling approach is 
somewhat ad hoc, yet is required in the light of the given data availability. The approach 
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5.3.3. Results 
We turn to the General Equity category of Unit Trust funds as our sample in our empirical 
analysis to assess the relationship between tracking error and relative return. For 
illustration purposes, we plot the sampled relative return and tracking error for each 
General Equity fund, bootstrapped using monthly data form January 1995 to April 2001 . 
The benchmark used is the Peer group mean. 
General Equity Funds Annualised TE vs Annualised Return 
(against Peer Group) : Jan 1995 - April 2001 
. . • 
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Figure 5.3 Bootstrap of Relative Returns and Tracking errors of General Equity Funds 
As can be seen in Figure 5.3, using the bootstrapping approach one is able to generate 
sufficient data so that the spatial positioning of relative return and tracking error is clearly 
intuitive. As the tracking error increases, the dispersion of relative return increases as one 
would expect. This reflects the higher probability of out- and under performing the fund 
has against the benchmark with increased tracking error. This fan shape is directly related 
to the assertion that the degree of relative return possible is predominately determined by 
the tracking error taken. The dispersion of tracking error indicates a large concentration of 
tracking errors at lower values, with a sparse concentration at higher values. This 
distribution of tracking error is related to the Chi-squared distribution, which has a 










Chapter 5:Some contributions to Risk management for active managers 
distribution skewed to the right, i.e. has a long positive tail. This skewness is clearly 
evident through the extreme tracking error points lying to the right. 
The approach taken now that the sampling procedure has been completed involves 
computing the probabilities of out- and underperformance achievable for each level of 
tracking error. The computation is based on a conditional probability stated as follows: 
'given that the tracking error is less than x, what is the likelihood that a relative return of y 
is exceeded'. In order to compute this probability for each level of tracking error, the 
number of points falling above I or below the relative return (y) at each tracking error limit, 
is divided by the total number of points at each tracking error limit. This computation is 
continuously repeated for each tracking error limit. 
Probilbili tyof 4th qUill tile 
underpclforillance 
Figure 5.4 Probabilty of 1st and 4tn quartile performance vs Tracking Error 
For illustration purposes, we demonstrate the results of the probability plots of the Top 10 
South African pension funds. As can be seen in Figure 5.4, the shape of the probability 
plots are intuitive as the probability of both out- and underperforming increases with 
tracking error. More specifically, the probability of outperforming the 1st quartile limit as 
well as underperforming the 4th quartile limit increases monotonically from a tracking error 
of 0 to the maximum tracking error. These probability increases occur initially at an 










Chapter 5:Some contributions to Risk management for active managers 
increasing rate, then at a decreasing rate at higher tracking error levels. The probability 
function then asymptotes to a certain probability at the highest tracking error level. 
However, as seen in the graph, the probability of outperformance increases at an 
increasing rate at slightly lower tracking errors than the probability of underperforming. 
The implication of the difference in the slope of these probabilities is that there exists an 
optimal tracking error range where the increase in probability of outperforming is higher 
than the increase in probability of outperforming. Based on this analysis, a 
recommendation can thus be made that a tracking error of 2.4 should not be exceed in 
this Pension fund category, as the probability of underperforming increases above the 
probability of outperforming. Clearly such a situation must be avoided to ensure severe 
underperformance is avoided in the long run. 
In Table 5.1 we report the tabulated probabilities of attaining specified performance 
criteria at each tracking error level. This table would be used to set tracking error limits for 
managers to fall within. For example, in Table 5.1, to have a maximum probability of 10% 
of underperforming the General Equity benchmark by 4%, the appropriate maximum 
tracking error would be 4.5%. Conversely, to have a minimum probability of 10% of 
outperforming the General Equity benchmark by 2%, the appropriate minimum tracking 
error would be 3%. In Appendix 5A, the corresponding probability tables for the FINDI 
category is given. 
Table 5.1 Probabilities of relative performance given tracking error limits in the General 
Equity category 
Tracking Error Limits 
Probability of 
Perfonnance <3 <3.5 . ~ <4.5 <5 <5.5 <6 
Prob« -10%) 0.12% 0.30% 0.50% 0.80% 0.97% 1.34% 1.68% 
~rob« -5%) 2.03% 3.55% 4.79% 6.16% 7.44% 8.78% 9.72% 
Prob« -4%) 3.66% 5.72% 7.46% 9.20% 10.85% 12.31% 13.46% 
Prob«-3%) 6.60% 9.11% 11.24% 13.36% 15.23% 16.89% 18.06% 
Prob« -2.5%) 8.62% 11.29% 13.65% 15.96% 17.83% 19.56% 20.76% 
Prob«-2%) 11 .20% 14.08% 16.51% 18.83% 20.73% 22.49% 23.72% 
Prob(> 2%) 9.69% 12.70% 15.53% 17.67% 19.36% 20.65% 21.74% 
ft,rob(> 3%) 5.17% 7.69% 10.25% 12.19% 13.83% 15.07% 16.18% 
Prob(> 3.5%) 3.99% 6.25% 8.61% 10.37% 11.79% 12.95% 13.98% 
Prob(> 4%) 3.15% 5.05% 7.12% 8.70% 10.01% 11.19% 12.22% 
~>..I%) 1.81% 3.22% 4.84% 6.12% 7.15% 8.25% 9.20% 
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IProb(> 10%) 0.19% I 0.37% I 0.62% I 0.77% I 1.13% I 1.39% I 1.74% I 
This section was aimed at applying the bootstrapping technique to create more fund 
performance data, enabling one to reliably make judgments on tracking error mandates. 
Although the technique is ad hoc, it at least serves to give some indication as to 
reasonable tracking error ranges. 
Now that tracking error mandates can appropriately be set, the subsequent section deals 
with determining the optimal amount of tracking error to be used on benchmark timing risk 
and stock selection risk. The study focuses on the split of tracking error of the consistent 
top-performers. 
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5.4. Risk taking habits of consistent top performers 
5.4.1. Introduction and discussion 
The focus in this section is to assess the risk-taking habits of fund managers in South 
Africa with a specific focus on the risk-taking habits of the consistent top performers. The 
General Equity category of Unit trusts is used as a laboratory in the ensuing empirical 
study. The specific emphasis is on the assessment of both their stock selection and 
benchmark timing risks over each of the prior 6 years. We used the following formulae for 
the decomposition of tracking error variance: 
TEV (p -lYa:enchmark + a;, 
where benchmark timing proportion = 
and selection proportion = 




.. . (5.3) 
Clearly, the higher the deviation of the fund's beta is from 1, the higher the benchmark 
timing proportion of TEV. This deviation is often the cause of significant differences in the 
asset allocation of the fund and benchmark. The selection proportion of TEV is most often 
affected by Significant aifferences in the stock selection of the fund and the benchmark, as 
noted by the deviation of the fund correlation from with the benchmark. 
In Figure 5.5 we display the 12-month rolling component splits of timing and selection 
risks as a proportion of the tracking error of the General Equity category of funds. The 
benchmark used in all our analysis in this report is the aggregate peergroup return. 
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Figure 5.5: Average proportions of Tracking Error taken up by Relative Market Risk 
and Unique Risk in the General Equity Category 
The rolling estimation approach assists in gaining a perspective on the dynamics of the 
component benchmark risks taken through time. From Figure 5.5 it is evident that the 
majority of the tracking error has consistently been used up on stock selection and a far 
smaller proportion of risk-taking has been used up on benchmark timing. On average, 
85% of the tracking error was used up on stock selection, and only 15% used up on 
benchmark timing over the prior 6 years (as indicated by the dotted line in Figure 5.5). 
These results confirm that managers are generally reluctant to use up their risk-taking 
capacity on benchmark timing. 
This preference for avoiding benchmark timing risk is perhaps intuitive as taking on asset 
allocation risks requires research on major asset classes, a far more widely analysed 
(hence more efficient) component of investments than analysis on local stocks. Hence 
there is likely to be better payoffs for researching more inefficient series such as local 
stocks, suggesting taking on stock selection risks is indeed more prudent. 
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5.4.2. Methodology and Data 
We continue our focus on the General Equity category to gain insights on the risk-taking 
habits of consistent top performers, as well as poor performers. Our assessment period 
incorporated the prior seven years of fund performance history. 
To identify consistent performers, the quartile performance positions of the General Equity 
funds were averaged (over the 7 year period) and again ranked and partitioned into 
quartiles. The top quartile of average quartile ranks gives a good indication of the 
consistent top performing funds and similarly the 4th quartile of average quartile funds 
represent the consistently poor performers. 
5.4.3. Results 
Table 5.2 that follows shows the summary results of the partitioning and includes the 
average percentage of tracking error used up on benchmark timing for each fund. 
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Table 5.2: the average Quartile ranks for the Funds in the General Equity Category with 
associated proportion of Tracking Error used up on Timing Risk and Selection Risk. 
Funds Average Average Timing Average Stock 
Quartile Proportion Selection 
" Proportion 
FT NIB Prime Select 1.29 9.1% 90.9% 
Liberty RSA Equity R 1'.67 4.7% 95.3% 
Metropolitan General Equity 1.r~ 15.3% 84.7% 
BoE Equity 2.14 /1", 12.1% 8T.9% 
Liberty Wealthbuilder R 
: 2.14 ill 9.7% 90.3% 
Fedsure Index 2.17 8.4% 9116% 
Investec Index R 2.17 6.7% 93.3% 
Investec Equity R 2.29 16.9% 83.1% , 
Liberty Prosperity R 2.2$ !i! 7.0% 93.0% 
RMB Equity 2.29 20.6% 79.4% -
Community Growth 2.43 7.1% 92~9% 
Sage Fund 2.43 27.2% 72.8% 
Gryphon Imp SA Tracker 2.50 iii 17.4% 82.6% 
Standard Bk Index R 2.50 4.7% 95.3% 
Coronation High Growth 2.60 23.2% 76.8% 
ABSA Growth FoF 2.87 37.8% 62.2% 
FNB Growth 2.61 .. 5.5% 94.5% 
Futuregrowth Core Equity 2.67 
, 
19.2% i ' 80.8% 
Old Mutual Top Companies 2.71 16.8% 83.2% 
~ 
Standard Bk Mutual R 2.71 12.9% 87.1% 
.~ 
FT NIB L T Wealth Creator 2.75 17.9% 82.1% 
Nedbank Growth 2.75 6.4% -'93.6% 
ABSA General R 2.86 12.7% 87.3% 
Old Mutual Investors 2.86 28.6% 71.4% 
Fedsure Equity 3.00 19.1% 80.9% 
m Cubed Capital Equity FoF 3.00 15.4% 84.60'{' 
RMB Performance FoF 3.00 30.5% 69.5% .' 
Sanlam General 3.00 16.6% 83.4% 
San lam Future Trends 3.33 20.6% 79.4% 
Brait Accelerated Growth 3.67 . 3.7% 96.3% 
Fedsure Pioneer 4.00 9.6% i' 90.4% 
In order to quantify the benchmark timing risks of the consistent top performers, we 
selected all General Equity funds having a history of 5 or more years. Thereafter we 
partitioned the average quartile positions of these funds once more into quartiles depicting 
the consistent performers, and averaged the benchmark timing risks within each quartile. 
The resulting average percentage of benchmark timing risk in each performance quartile 
is shown Table 5.3 which follows. 
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Table 5.3 The average proportion of Tracking Error used up on Timing Risk by the funds in 
the different quartiles 
Quartile AVe(8ge Proportion 





Interestingly there is a clear trend between the performance quartile positions and the 
proportion of tracking error used up on benchmark timing risk as seen in Table 5.3. The 
top quartile of consistent performers have clearly used up the smallest percentage of their 
tracking error on benchmark timing, with an average of only 11.4%. A systematic increase 
in the percentage of benchmark timing risk is evident as performance quartiles decline to 
the 4th quartile performers. A plausible reason for these results is that intuition suggests 
that it's likely that managers require more risk and I or skill to generate outperformance 
through asset allocation (driven primarily through benchmark timing) than stock selection 
risk. 
These results give some evidence that consistent superior performers have taken on 
relatively smaller proportions of benchmark timing risk for this sample of General Equity 
Funds for the prior 7-year period. 
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Appendix 5A 
Table SA Probabilities of relative performance given tracking error limits for the FINDI 
category 
... 
I!' Tracking Error Limits 
P.rObablitty of . 
Peiformance <3 <3.25 <3.5 <3.7S <4 <4.25 ~.5 
Pr«4) 1.61% 2.61% 3.77% 5.24% 6.43% 7.52% 8.23% 
Pr«-5) 2.57% 3.85% 5.46% 7.28% 8.82% 10.18% 11.13% 
Pt« ..... 5) 3.16% 4.65% 6.38% 8.40% 10.17% 11 .55% 12.56% 
Pr« .... ) 4.00% 5.59% 7.52% 9.80% 11.76% 13.21% 14.34% 
Pr«-3) 6.13% 8.05% 10.45% 13.08% 15.36% 17.10% 18.52% 
iPr«-2) 10.08% 12.36% 15.09% 18.03% 20.54% 22.42% 24.05% 
P1'(>2) 9.58% 11.38% 12.98% 14.98% 16.83% 18.69% 20.00% 
Pr(>3) 5.16% 6.74% 8.25% 9.99% 11.69% 13.38% 14.62% 
"1'(>3.5) I!!l 4.03% 5.48% 6.79% 8.35% 9.86% 11.40% 12.49% 
~r(>4) 3.13% 4.35% 5.57% 6.97% 8.36% 9.75% 10.76% 
Pr(>5) 1.94% 2.76% 3.61% 4.74% 5.83% 6.93% 7.79% 
Prl>tU" 1.14% 1.75% 2.35% 3.19% 4.09% 4.98% 5.62% 
























Chapter 6: Multi - manager topics 
CHAPTER 6: MULTI - MANAGER TOPICS 
Multi-management has become a substantial feature of the South African fund 
management industry. In this chapter, two studies in the area of multi-management having 
a quantitative theme are reviewed separately. The first topic investigates the impact of 
combining managers has on the active risk of a multi-manager portfolio, whereas the 
following topic reviews the evidence of persistence of fund performance on the South 
African Unit Trust Industry. 
6.1. The Impact of Combining managers on active risk 
6.1.1 Introduction and discussion 
The popularity of a multi-manager approach to fund management is well entrenched in 
South Africa, predominantly because this type of fund management has the ability to 
reduce the manager risk through fund diversification. In the Unit Trust industry, the extent 
of multi-manager activity is reflected in the large proportion of flows into unit trust funds 
from multi-manager activity. Its popularity has also been noticed in the pension fund 
industry, as many institutional pension funds diversify their portfolio by combining funds 
managed by carefully selected managers. 
Multi-managers typically aim to outperform the peer group by optimally selecting a 
portfolio of funds, which performs better than the average of the peer group (benchmark). 
In order to avoid the risk of significantly underperforming this benchmark, multi-managers 
have the difficult task of choosing the skilful managers most often with only short 
performance track records available. Furthermore, due to the large size of funds, 
especially in the institutional fund industry, multi-managers most often spread their 
portfolio across different managers to avoid too much concentration in specific stocks (and 
also to diversify manager risk away). 
Besides the issue of which managers to select, multi-managers face an equally important 
question of how many to select. The concern is that if too many managers are selected, 
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the resultant fund will perform like a peergroup benchmark tracking fund. Hence not only 
will the probability of outperforming the peer group aggregate become too low, but the 
payment of fees for actively managed fees becomes unwarranted. Clearly, to outperform 
the peer group, a multi-managed fund has to take on sufficient active risk (tracking error). 
Hence the question arises as to how many managers, when combined, yield a resultant 
passive fund. This question is the primary aim of this section. 
A further concern for multi-managers is the cost of netting off of transactions between 
funds within the multi-managed fund. Often some managers may be buying the same 
stocks another manager is selling, effectively canceling out any active bets taken by each 
manager, but still incurring transaction costs. The portfolio structure thus remains 
unchanged, yet costs detract from the portfolio performance. 
It is thus imperative to consider the marginal impact of adding additional fund managers to 
the multi-managed portfolio. Additional to assessing the impact of combining an 
increasing number of standard managers, the report also assesses the impact of adding 
managers specifically chosen because of various levels of: 
• manager aggression, 
• fund size, and 
• stock selection skill 
6.1.2 Data and methodology 
The analysis was conducted on the General Equity (GE) category of Unit Trusts (and 
repeated for Pension fund data using the Top 10 large Manager Watch). Micropal return 
data was used for the unit trust data, which includes fund returns with dividends 
reinvested. The study was conducted on data starting in January 1998 through to August 
2001. Due to the limited number of funds in many unit trust categories, the study focussed 
the analysis on the General Equity Category of unit trusts (here forth called GE). Pension 
fund data is sourced from Alexander Forbes, with the largest 10 Pension funds used in the 
sample set. We report only on the General Equity fund results here, and summarised 
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The method for the analysis uses Monte Carlo Simulation to randomly sample (:) 6 
possible combinations ·Jf funds chosen for n out of m possible managers in a portfolio 
(O<n<m). For each sample of random funds selected to be combined into one portfolio, an 
equally weighted average of the funds are taken. The portfolio returns are reconstructed 
for each sample given the time series of each fund's returns. The multi-managed portfolio 
returns at time t are thus: 
R, 
1 n 
= - L ro ,where ro are the returns for fund i at time t. 
n i=1 
This vector of returns is sampled for various combinations of n out of m funds. 
For each sample of portfolio return, a relative return and tracking error is computed, with 
the peer group used as a benchmark. This simulation is repeated for n = 1 to m funds. 
The median tracking error of each set of n funds is computed and compared to the optimal 
active tracking error ranges suggested for the category to establish whether they fall 
within the active range. 
To represent a realistic sample of core/passive funds in the analysis we use the GE 
peergroup trackers: Futuregrowth Core, NIB Quants and Woolworths (known to be the 
peergroup tracker funds) to set the passive tracking error ranges. 
The simulated relative returns and tracking errors are also compared to the peer group 
passive / core funds' relative returns and tracking errors. These relative returns and 
tracking errors are generated through the bootstrapping approach, and sampled 1000 
times. In order to model the relative space occupied by the passive funds, we use the 
formulation for a non-centred ellipse?, and solve the parameters for the ellipse by using 
the bootstrapped data. 
4 where (:)=n!(:~n)! 
? The formulation of the non-centred ellipse is given as (x - a)2 + (y - b )2 = 1, e /2 
where x = tracking error sample ,Y = relative return sample 
a = mean tracking error sample, b = mean relative return sample 
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It is important to note that our research design does not specifically address the case 
where multi-managers select specialist managers within domestic equity categories. 
6.1.3 Results 
The results cover the GE category of unit trusts with summarised results for the 10 largest 
pension funds found in the appendix. We begin with the GE unit trust category. 
6.1.3.1 Combining Standard Managers 
Suggested Tracking error 
range for active managers 
. . 
. . 
5 or more standard managers 




'. 5 Managers 
)f 6 Managers 
1: 7 Managers 
.8 Managers 
( 9 Managers 
10 Managers 
Figure 6.1: Tracking Error versus Relative Return for GE Unit Trusts 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the resultant range of relative return and tracking error when 
combining 1 to 10 out of the 32 GE Funds sampled (each group represented by a different 
colour). The black cluster of points represents the bootstrapped passive/core funds, with 
the red ellipse modeling the probable space of the core funds in active risk/return space. 
The minimum tracking error for these passive funds is 0.25%, with the maximum tracking 
error for passive funds being 2.38%. We superimpose the ideal/ optimal range for active 
funds in the diagram above (this range has been obtained from the prior research on 
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The dispersion of relative returns clearly decreases as the number of combined managers 
increase, as seen in Figure 6.1. This result is fairly intuitive and can be seen in the fan-
shaped dispersion of relative returns and tracking errors. 
Figure 6.2 portrays the median tracking error obtained for the various numbers of 
combined managers. A central insight from Figure 6.2 is that for as few as 4 managers, 
the combined median tracking error of 4 combined managers falls below 3% (the lower 
bound for optimal active tracking error range) . This implies that when combining standard 
GE managers with the intention of taking sufficient active risk to outperform the peer 
group, 4 or more managers would defeat this purpose - clearly having too little active risk. 
Notice that the median tracking error decreases to below 2.38% (the maximum tracking 
error for the passive funds) as soon as 6 managers are combined . 
Our results suggests that combining 6 or more funds would notionally yield a fund that is 
essentially a passive fund. There's a marginal decrease in tracking error thereafter, thus 
the impact of combining additional managers, is small. Combining 8 managers produces a 
median tracking error below 2%, which is well recognised to be within the passive tracking 
error range for GE funds. 
More than 4 standard managers can 
result in a combirled fund being outside 
the optimal range of active funds 
Suggested Tracking error range 
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Next we consider when both the tracking error and active return falls within the passive 
rangeB. The results are presented as probabilities of resultant "passive" returns and are 
summarised in Figure 6.3. The figure thus shows the probability of GE funds falling in the 
passive fund relative risk and return space when combining 1 to 10 managers. 
6 or more standard 
managers - more than 50% 
of returns will be passive 
Figure 6.3: Probability of combined GE funds falling in the passive fund 
relative risk I return space 
B We do this by calculating the proportion of the combined funds that fall within the passive funds' perimeter-
as a measure of the probability of returns being passive with increasing number of managers. 
The computation used for each n = 1 to m managers, involves using the combined portfolios' tracking error (x) 
and relative return (y) and applying the passive non-centred ellipse formulation, i.e. 
(x-a)2 (y_b)2 
-'---+ --'--~ e /2 (2), 
thus using the parameters corresponding to the passive funds, we have 
(3) 
The proportion of pairs of points for which (3) is less than unity for n = 1 to 32 managers would represent the 
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Figure 6.3 clearly illustrates the increasing probabilities of falling into passive relative risk-
return space corresponding with the increasing number of combined GE managers. 
Interestingly, when combining 6 (or more) standard managers, the probability of yielding 
passive relative risk-return points exceeds 50%. Another interpretation of this result is that 
when combining 6 or more standard managers, more than half the relative risks and 
returns generated would be passive. 
Clearly there is no incentive to choose 6 (or more) standard managers based on this 
result if a multi-manager wishes to be active against the peer group. This result is entirely 
consistent with the earlier result where the median tracking error for combining 6 standard 
funds fell below the maximum tracking error for passive funds. Since the median 
separates the 6-manager portfolio data set in half, more than 50% of the relative risk I 
return points would be below the upper bound of passive funds, and less than half would 
be active. 
The corresponding proportion of passive relative risks-returns obtained by combining 10 
standard managers is 99,2%. Clearly if a multi-managers randomly selected only 10 
standard GE funds, they would (on average) reproduce tracking errors and relative returns 
entirely consistent with a passive fund. This strategy would however occur at a higher 
active management costs. 
Table 6.1: Quantitative Results from simulation of combining standard GE Funds 
No. of Tracking Error Prob. Relative Returns Percentile of Relative Returns 
Managers Average Median and TE Passive 5'" 95'" 
1 5.64 5.14 4.9% -12.24 13.44 
2 4.17 3.90 2.7% -8.04 9.13 
3 3.36 3.24 10.0% -7.33 8.93 
4 2.90 2.83 22.0% -5.94 7.79 
5 2.52 2.45 44.7% -4.83 5.62 
• 2.27 2.22 62.0% -4.86 5.14 7 2.05 2.01 81 .1% -4.12 4.91 
8 1.90 1.86 90.6% -3.97 4.75 
9 1.74 1.72 96.3% -3.83 4.04 
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The above results suggest that combining standard GE funds with the objective of 
constructing a resultant active fund, is somewhat restrictive in the context of the number of 
managers that can be combined. Below we now consider the effect of combining 
aggressive and moderately aggressive GE funds in a portfolio. 
6.1.3.2 Combining Managers based on aggression 
In this section we investigate the impact of combining only aggressive managers on the 
resultant active risks of the combined fund. The rationale for investigating the selection of 
more aggressive managers is based on the notion that conservative managers - who take 
relatively smaller aggregate active bets - are more likely to diversify each other's bets 
away. Aggressive managers by contrast are less likely to have their larger diversified 
away as quickly as conservative managers. 
In this section we measure aggression as the tracking error, and not only stock selection 
risk. Thus, aggression may also reflect timing bets taken against the peer group 
benchmark, and not just stock selection bets. Timing bets (caused largely by asset 
allocation bets) also have the ability of creating larger tracking errors due to the fact that 
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Recalling the tracking error is decomposed into timing risk and selection risk as follows: 
tracking error timing risk selection risk, 
we partition the GE tur.ds, into aggressive, moderate and conservative relative risk-takers 
according to their tracking errors shown in table 2 that follows (over the same period as 
the period of the analysis). 
Table 6.2: GE funds ranked according to aggression based on tracking error 
RIa_ProftIe ~IEquIty Fund8 TntCklng Error nmlngRlsk SeI~RI.k 
iNedbank Growth 10.92 2.25 10.68 
~lIan Gray Equity 10.61 5.44 9.11 
Fedsure Pioneer 9.47 2.61 9.10 
.I ~BSA Growth FoF 7.71 2.86 7.17 
I iSanlam Future Trends 7.68 3.41 6.88 
I ~BSA General R 6.71 1.92 6.43 
C ~tandard Bk Aggressive FoF A 6.38 3.98 4.98 
iSage Fund 6.09 3.08 5.25 
~rait Accelerated Growth 5.87 0.55 5.84 
BoE Equity 5.78 1.42 5.61 
RMB Performance FoF 5.75 2.71 5.07 
Investee Index R 5.58 0.24 5.58 
'"'NB Growth 5.56 0.05 5.56 
I 
'"'edsure Equity 5.44 1.73 5.16 
Old Mutual Top Companies 5.25 2.11 4.81 
Standard Bk Mutual R 5.23 2.60 4.53 
~etropolitan General Equity 5.18 0.39 5.16 
fT NIB Prime Select 5.10 0.80 5.04 
Fedsure Index 4.79 0.19 4.78 
iberty Wealthbuilder R 4.64 1.83 4.26 
~tandard Bk Index R 4.61 0.45 4.59 
~MB Equity 4.38 0.62 4.34 
Investee Equity R 4.30 0.29 4.29 
j 
~ommunity Growth 4.21 0.19 4.21 
~ Cubed Capital Equity FoF 4.18 0.22 4.17 
Iold Mutual Investors 4.10 1.30 3.88 
!coronation High Growth 3.81 0.86 3.71 
I'-iberty Prosperity R 3.45 0.30 3.43 
iSanlam General 3.41 1.60 3.01 
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Thereafter we combine the aggressive funds randomly in all possible combinations of 1 
through to 10 managers using the same methodology as described in the prior section for 
standard managers. The benchmark remains the peer group average of all standard 
managers, and the relative returns and tracking errors are calculated against this 
benchmark. We also repeat the analysis for moderate funds and assess the decrease in 
tracking error with increasing number of funds for both groups. 
The summary resulting active returns and risks of the aggressive managers contrasted to 
the moderate managers are portrayed in figure 6.3. 
In Figure 6.3 that follows, it is evident that combining aggressive GE funds results in a 
combined fund having more active risk than would have been attained by combining 
moderate risk GE funds. Multi-managers can combine up to 5 aggressive managers 
before their active risk falls below the optimal range, by contrast to only 2 for moderate 
managers. 
Combining 5 aggressive managers - equivalent to 2 
moderate managers 
• Aggressive General Equity Managers 
6.60 • Moderate General Equity Managers 
Figure 6.3: Median Tracking Error for combining aggressive and moderate 
GE Unit Trusts 
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The above analysis suggests that multi-managers who are able to set higher tracking 
error mandates for their managers would be able to select several more managers as a 
consequence. 
6.1.3.3 Combining managers based on fund sizes 
Another aspect to consider when combining funds is the selection of funds based on size. 
The intuition is that the size of a fund is associated with the ability of the fund to be 
aggressive. It has been argued that large funds are unable to obtain enough scrip to 
construct large active bets against their benchmark. 
The converse also applies to small funds. Their ability to actively trade mid- and small-cap 
shares enables smaller funds to take larger active bets against their benchmark. This 
ability in turn allows smaller funds to potentially take on higher tracking errors. 
Our analysis partitioned the GE unit trusts into 3 groups according to fund size: large, 
medium and small funds. Based on fund size at August 2001, large funds were selected 
as having fund sizes larger the R 1 000 000, with medium sized funds between R 250 000 
and R 1 000 000, and small funds less than R250 000. The simulation procedure was 
repeated by selecting from the 3 groups of funds. The results are portrayed graphically in 
Figure 6.4 that follows. 9 
9 Note there are only 7 funds that fell into the large catergory. These funds were (in descending 
fund size order - Rm's) : Old Mutual Investors (R3480.04), FT NIB Prime Select (R1727.77), 
Coronation High Growth (R1648.57), Investec Equity (R1442.11), LibertyWealthbuilder 
(R1420.21), Sage Fund (R1412.61) and BOE Equity (R1022.83). 
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Combinations of larger funds can yield more 
conservative/passive funds 
o Small • Medium • Large 
Figure 6.4: Median Tracking Error for combining small, medium and large GE Unit Trusts 
The results in figure 6.4 are once again intuitive, as selecting larger funds yielded smaller 
median tracking errors at each number of managers selected. Furthermore, the tracking 
errors of small funds are significantly higher than medium and large funds, with a small 
difference in tracking error between medium and large funds. There is minimal benefit in 
combining medium sized GE funds as opposed to large GE funds in terms of active risk. 
However, the result that combinations of large funds yield more conservative funds is 
confirmed by the above results. 
Small sized funds appear to asymptote at a median tracking error of 4%. At this level the 
unique risk interestingly does not diversify away as reflected by the sluggish decrease in 
median tracking error of small funds. 
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6.1.3.4 Combining managers based on skill 
The last aspect considered in the multi-manager context is manager skill. We use 
selection reward (as measured by the funds alpha) divided by selection risk as a measure 
of manager skill (in essence the information ratio). We measure persistence of skill by 
ranking funds according to their "average rank" of this skill measure over the entire period. 
The following funds were thus selected based on having "average ranks" less than 2.5 
and are portrayed in the table that follows: 
Table 6.4: Average rank of General Equity Funds (1995 - 2001) 
Funds Average Rank 
lMetropolitan General Equity 1.6 
BoE Equity 1.8 
Investee Equity 2.0 
Marriot Dividend Growth 2.0 
NIB Prime Select 2.2 
Pld Mututal Investors 2.2 
RMB Equity 2.2 
Nedbank Growth 2.3 
Sage Fund 2.4 
Coronation High Growth 2.5 
The results of the simulation based on combining the above funds and computing the 
combined portfolio's relative returns and risks against the peer group benchmark are 
portrayed in Figure 6.5 that follows. 
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Can select 5 or 6 skilled managers 
before combjned tul'ld is outside the 
optimal ral'lge of active funds! 
Figure 6.5: Median Tracking Error for combining GE Unit Trusts with persistent skill 
The results of Figure 6.5 show that as many as 6 managers with persistent skill can be 
combined before their median tracking error falls below 3%, thus declining below the 
optimal range for active GE funds. 
6.1.4. Conclusion 
Although the focus in this section was somewhat restrictive because we focussed 
predominantly on the General Equity category of Unit Trusts, the analysis nevertheless 
yielded some useful practical insights for multi-managers. 
The analysis on combining managers according to a variety of selection criteria suggest 
that combining more than 4 standard General Equity managers usually results in a 
combined fund having a passive character, falling outside of the ideal active risk range. 
The findings also suggested that one can increase the number of managers (to 
approximately 6) by selecting more aggressive managers, managers with persistent stock 
selection skill or avoiding larger funds. 
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------------------------------------------~--
6.2. Persistence of Fund performance 10 
6.2.1. Introduction and discussion 
Marketing strategies of Unit Trusts are commonly based on the notion that investors 
purchase funds on the basis of their track records. These marketing strategies indirectly 
imply that funds that have done well in some recent period will continue to do well in the 
future. 
It is commonly accepted amongst academics that stock markets are efficient, suggesting 
that no perSistent superior performance should be expected for individual stocks (see 
Fama (1970». But managers of investment funds can change their risk-profiles far more 
quickly than managers of individual stock companies. Does this flexibility in decision-
making enable managers of funds to achieve what eludes managers of stock companies -
persistent winning performance? 
Clearly evidence on the persistence of fund performance is crucial to investors and multi-
managers alike. If perSistence is found to be present in South African Unit Trusts, 
strategies of buying winning funds and I or selling lOSing funds would prove to be 
profitable. This section considers the contribution current evidence has on the persistence 
of the fund performance debate. Not only does this study enable analysis over a longer 
period, but a significantly larger sample of surviving funds are now available by 
comparison to other studies. 
6.2.2 Review 
In a study conducted in the USA, Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996), find tentative evidence 
that USA funds that have done well in the past tend to do well in the future 11. Meyer 
10 This section has been published in Bradfield and Swartz (2001), "Recent evidence on the 
~ersistence offund performance", SA Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 15, No.2, 99-109. 
1 Malkiel (1995), Brown and Goetzmann (1995) and GrinBlatt and Titman (1992) all additionally 
find evidence of perSistence of performance of USA funds. See the reference section. 
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(1997) conducted one of the first rigorous studies 12 on persistence of performance using 
South African fund performance data over the 1985-1995 period. Meyer also tentatively 
concluded "some persistence in performance of South African unit trusts, does exist". 
In the light of the fact that we have more funds with longer performance history in the unit 
trust industry, and the recent volatility of the South African market we revisit the issue of 
fund persistence. In this section we therefore disclose and discuss the results of a study 
on persistence of fund performance and highlight some implications for fund selection and 
management. 
6.2.3 Data 
The data source used is Micropal, which includes fund returns with dividends reinvested. 
The study was conducted over the prior 7 years, starting January 1995 through to August 
2001. To avoid interaction between category effects, the study focussed the analysis on 
the General Equity Category of Unit Trusts. Because of the structure of our test 
methodology, all General Equity funds with a history of less than three years were 
excluded from the analysis. 
6.2.4. Results 
6.2.4.1 Based on Annual Assessment periods 
The measure of performance on which the analysis has been based is the rankings of the 
absolute annual return of the funds in the General equity category. 
Table 6.5 contains a summary of the rankings of the absolute performance measures of 
the qualifying General Equity funds. The funds in Table 6.1 have been ranked according 
to their "average rank" over the entire period. 
12 Meyer presenter her evidence on perSistence of unit trust performance at the Southern African 
Finance Association conference in January 1997. 
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Table 6.5: Ranked and quartile positions of returns of General Equity funds (Jan 1995-
August 2001) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Average 
Rank Quartile Rank Quartile Rank Quartile Rank Quartile Rank Quartile Rank Quartile Rank Quartile Rank Quartile 
iAllan Gray Equity - - - - - - - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0 
FT NIB Prime Select 1 1 1 1 4 1 5 1 13 2 4 1 14 2 6.0 
Liberty RSA Equity R - - - - - - 7 1 10 2 10 2 9.0 
Metropolitan General Equity 2 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 26 4 2 1 23 3 8.9 
BoEEquity 5 2 3 1 2 1 21 4 31 4 13 2 7 1 11.7 
ILlberty Wealth builder R 9 3 9 2 15 3 22 4 8 1 8 1 5 1 10.9 
IFedsure Index - 11 3 16 4 17 3 6 1 7 1 4 1 10.2 
nvestee Index R - - 8 2 19 4 9 2 3 1 21 3 3 1 10.5 
lnvestec Equity R 13 4 5 1 5 1 12 2 12 2 27 4 15 2 12.7 
Liberty Prosperity R 6 2 16 4 10 2 23 4 4 1 11 2 6 1 10.9 
RMB Equity 4 1 6 2 7 2 20 4 16 2 15 2 17 3 12.1 
!community Growth 10 3 18 4 1 1 8 2 27 4 14 2 8 1 12.3 
~age Fund 12 4 4 1 17 4 13 3 19 3 6 1 2 1 10.4 
Gryphon Imp SA Tracker - - - - 16 3 2 1 20 3 22 3 15.0 
~tandard Bk Index R - - 15 4 18 4 14 3 5 1 5 1 11 2 11.3 
Foronation High Growth - - - 13 3 2 1 17 3 23 3 19 3 14.8 
IABSA Growth FoF - - - - - - - 23 3 3 1 28 4 18.0 
FNBGrowth - - - - - - - 10 2 25 4 9 2 14.7 
Futuregrowth Core Equity - - - - - - - 22 3 22 3 16 2 20.0 
Pld Mutual Top Companies 3 1 7 2 8 2 19 4 20 3 24 3 27 4 15.4 
~tandard Bk Mutual R 8 2 13 3 9 2 15 3 24 3 16 2 25 4 15.7 
FT NIB L T Wealth Creator - - - - - - 18 4 9 2 12 2 21 3 15.0 
Nedbank Growth - - - 1 1 15 2 32 4 32 4 20.0 
ABSA General R 11 3 12 3 14 3 6 1 32 4 28 4 12 2 16.4 
Old Mutual Investors 15 4 14 4 12 3 10 2 11 2 19 3 13 2 13.4 
Fedsure Equity 7 2 17 4 6 2 3 1 28 4 30 4 29 4 17.1 
m Cubed Capital Equity FoF - - - - - - 11 2 30 4 17 3 18 3 19.0 
RMB Performance FoF - - - - - - 25 4 9 2 20 3 18.0 
San lam General 14 4 10 3 11 3 7 2 21 3 18 3 24 3 15.0 
Sanlam Future Trends - - - - - - - 14 2 29 4 30 4 24.3 
Brait Accelerated Growth - - - - - 18 3 26 4 26 4 23.3 
Fedsure Pioneer - - - - - - - - 29 4 31 4 31 4 30.3 
It is evident from the last column in Table 6.5 headed, "Average Quartile", that Allan Gray 
exhibited persistently superior performance to the extent that they were able to remain in 
the top ranked position (although based on a restricted 3 year history). NIB Prime Select, 
has the next lowest (best) average rank, remaining in the 1 sl quartile for the first 4 years, 
and slipping to a 2nd quartile performer in 199~and 2001 13. On the losing side, Fedsure 
Pioneer has persistently remained in the 4th quartile (although it too is based on a 
13 1t should be noted that NIB Prime Select changed fund managers in 2001. 
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restricted 3 year history). The columns headed "Average Rank" and "Average Quartile" 
are good indicators of the relative aggregate performance of qualifying General Equity 
funds. 
To gauge to what extent funds have exhibited perSistence in performance over the 7-year 
period, Table 6.6 below shows a more cursory summary of Table 6.5. Table 6.6 gives a 
summary of the percentage of funds whose ran kings moved both up and down by 1, 2, 
and 3 quartiles over each consecutive two-year period. 
Table 6.6: Percentage of funds changing quartiles in consecutive years 
1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 Average 
Moved up 3 quartiles 0.00% 5.56% 5.26% 13.04% 0.00% 3.13% 14.50% i 
Moved up 2 quartiles 13.33% 5.56% 15.79% 13.04% 18.75% 6.25% 
Moved up 1 quartile 26.67% 11.11% 21.05% 13.04% 12.50% 18.75% 17.19% 
Unchanged 26.67% 50.00% 10.53% 21.74% 40.63% 43.75% 32.22% 
Moved down 1 quartile 20.00% 11.11% 31.58% 8.70% I 9.38% 15.63% 16.06% 
•••• up 2 quartiles 0.00% 11.11% 15.79% 21.74% 15.63% 12.50% 12.79% 
IMoved up 3 quartiles 13.33% 5.56% 0.00% 8.70% 3.13% 0.00% 5.12% 
In Table 6.6 above it is evident that in the 1996-1997 period, half of the funds remained in 
the same quartile positions, and in the 1999-2000 period over a third of the funds 
remained in the same quartile positions. The periods 1997-1998 and 1998-1999 
represented periods having the most interquartile movements with only 11 % and 22% 
(respectively) of funds remaining in the same quartile positions. Interestingly 1998 was a 
period characterised by high market volatility. On average, 32% of funds have remained in 
the same quartile positions, with the average proportion of interquartile movements 
decreasing the higher the magnitude of the quartile position movement. 
We also subjected our results to more rigorous statistical scrutiny. To more formally test 
perSistence, we implemented a test to assess whether the consecutive annual rankings of 
fund performance was significantly correlated. Spearman's rank correlation measure was 
appropriate for this type of test, since the emphasis is on rankings of funds, and not 
performance of funds. A summary of the results is shown in Table 6.7. 
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Table 6.7: Spearmans rank correlations of consecutive annual performance ranks 
1995 -1996 1996 -1997 1997 -1998 1998 -1999 1999 - 2000 2000 - 2001 
No. of Funds 15 18 19 23 32 32 
~pearman's Rank Correlation 0.429 0.205 0.128 -0.342 0.248 0.498 
Ip-value 0.054 0.199 0.293 0.054 0.084 0.003 .. 
Note: The p-value conveys the degree of statistical significance. The smaller the p-value the more significant 
the result. 
The Spearman's Rank correlation is positive in 5 of the 6 consecutive periods analysed -
suggesting a positive relation between the ranked performance position in 5 of the 
periods. The exception was the 1998-1999 period yielding a negative ranked correlation 
(suggesting instead evidence of winners becoming losers and vice versa). 
More formal statistical inferences can be made by assessing the magnitude of the p-
values (levels of statistical significance) reflected in the last row of Table 6.7. Under the 
hypothesis that correlations of zero imply evidence of "lack of persistence of fund 
performance", our attention shifts to the degree of departures of the correlations from zero 
captured in the p-values. The smaller the p-value, the more significant the departure of the 
correlation from zero. From Table 6.7 it is evident that in 4 of the 6 periods the p-values 
were less than 0.1, suggesting some statistical evidence of non-zero correlations of fund 
performance rankings. In 3 of these 4 periods, including the last two periods the 
underlying correlations were positive (with the last period yielding a highly statistically 
significant p-value of 0.003) suggesting recent evidence of strong persistence of fund 
performance. 
Interestingly the 1998-1999 was the only period yielding a negative ranked correlation 
(with a p-value of 0.054), confirming that this period represented a reversal of persistence, 
i.e. winners becoming losers and vice versa. 
Even though conducting a rank correlation test is a rigorous measure of testing 
persistence (or lack thereof), it fails to identify the persistence of each quartile position. 
We next consider the persistence within each individual quartile, by assessing the 
proportions of various quartile movements in subsequent periods. Figure 6.6 shows the 
results of each quartile:s proportions of quartile positions in the subsequent period. 
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Figure 6.6: Distribution of quartile position of funds in their subsequent year 
From Figure 6.6 it is evident that the strongest persistence is found in 1 st quartile funds as 
is evidenced here by the 44% occurrence again in the 1st quartile in the subsequent 
periods. The next best level of persistence was found in the 3rd quartile, where 39% of the 
time, 3rd quartile funds have remained 3rd quartile in the subsequent period. A more 
interesting result has been the lack of persistence found in the 2nd quartile, where a high 
proportion of interquartile movement (37%) has been from the 2nd to the 4th quartile. 
Theses results give confirmation that the persistence found is predominantly a 
consequence of the superior, 15t quartile performers. Thus there does seem to be 
evidence of skill, rather than luck. 
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Simulating the investment strategies based on historical quartile performance ... 
To assess persistence from a practical investment perspective, we considered the impact 
of constructing portfolios based on historical top quartile performers, second quartile 
performers etc.. Portfolios were rebalanced annually by equally weighting the funds in 
each performance quartile (based on the quartile performance of the prior year). Returns 
were accumulated on the subsequent year of "unseen" data. 
The portfolios were first formed at the end of December 1995 (based on 1995 
performance) and rebalanced annually and monitored through to August 2001. 
Figure 6.7 shows the results of investing in these rebalanced portfolios based on the 
historical performance quartiles of their component funds. 
-1st Quartile -2nd Quartile - 3rd Quartile - 4th Quartile - - -Benelmark 
Figure 6.7: Cumulative returns from annual rebalancing of portfolios in the same 
performance quartile 
The most startling result portrayed in Figure 6.7, is the unexpectedly high return obtained 
by investing in historical 151 quartile performers. This strategy yielded a cumulative return 
of 96%. Contrary to popular local belief there does seem to be evidence that superior skill 
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exists and is being translated into superior performance, consistently! Interestingly the 
second best strategy was to invest in the category benchmark (yielding 58%)- and the 
worst was to invest in second quartile performers yielding only 34%. 
We also assessed a variety of alternate strategies based on historical quartile 
performance. For example we considered a portfolio constructed from funds that improved 
by 1 and 2 quartiles and contrasted these to a portfolio of funds that moved down by 1 
and 2 quartiles. The results of the cumulative returns of portfolios constructed on this 
basis are shown in Figure 6.8. 
It is evident from Figure 6.8 that none of the alternate strategies of investing in funds that 
improved/declined in their quartile performance was superior to the strategy of investing in 
the peergroup benchmark. 
Figure 6.8: Cumulative returns from annual rebalancing of portfolios based on 
various scenarios of moving up and down the quartiles 
Lastly we also considered a strategy based on investing only in funds that never obtained 
a 4th quartile position in the seven year history analysed. We compared this to the strategy 
of investing in the peergroup benchmark in Figure 6.9. 
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Figure 6.9: Cumulative returns from annual rebalancing of a portfolio based on all 
funds that have never had 4th quartile performance. 
It is evident from Figure 6.9 that holding the peergroup benchmark was also superior to 
the strategy of combining all funds that have never had annual performance resulting in a 
4th quartile placing. In summary it seems that amongst all the alternatives considered 
above, only the strategy of investing in historical 1 st quartile performers was superior to 
investing in the peergroup benchmark. 
6.2.4.2 Based on quarterly Assessment periods 
The analysis was repeated by considering the shorter quarterly assessment periods. Even 
though superior performers show evidence of persistence on an annual assessment 
basis, it is of interest to assess to what extent persistence manifests itself in shorter 
periods. 
Based on the quartile ranking of the funds, we once again compute Spearman's rank 
correlation for each quarterly period, along with the associated p-value (reflecting the 
significance of the result). These results are found in Figure 6.10. 
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Figure 6.10: Spearman's Rank Correlation and associated p-value for testing 
persistence of General Equity fund performance based on a quarterly basis. 
It is evident from Figure 6.10 that the quarterly time series of Spearman's Rank correlation 
displays significant volatility. The rank correlation reached a high of 0.82 during the 2nd 
quarter 1998, and a low of - 0.30 during the 4th quarter of the same year. It should also be 
noted that General Equity funds generated a negative return of -24.1 % during this 
quarter. It was thus during this period that winners became losers and visa versa. The 
persistence analysis based on annual assessment periods also yielded negative 
persistence during 1998. 
The Spearman's correlation coefficient also displayed high levels of positive significance 
at certain quarters. This significance was especially evident from September 1996 to the 
high of 0.82 in June 1998. Throughout this period, Spearman's Rank correlation yielded 
an average of 0.57. Similar periods of high rank correlation and low p-value occur during 
the periods December 1998 to September 1999 and September 200 and June 2001. 
To identify the persistence present in each quartile position, we assess the proportions of 
various quartile movements in subsequent periods. Figure 6.11 shows the results of each 
quartile's proportions of quartile positions in the subsequent period. 










Chapter 6: Multi - manager topics 
Figure 6.11: Distribution of quartile position of funds in their subsequent quarter 
Assuming that no persistence existed, i.e. the results showed a zero Spearman's Rank 
correlation, each proportion is expected to be 25%. From Figure 6.11 however it is 
apparent that there are significant departures from this. This is evident by the maximum 
proportion of quartile rrovement being to the same quartile in the subsequent periods - for 
each quartile. The most persistence is found in the 4th quartile where 39% of the time, 4th 
quartile funds remained 4th quartile in the subsequent period. Marginally less persistence 
was found in the 1 rst quartile, where 39% of the time, 1 st quartile funds remained 1 st 
quartile in the subsequent period. Even though persistence was evident in the 2nd and 3rd 
quartiles, these were not as significant as 1st and 4th quartiles. 
Simulating investment performance based on quarterly assessment periods ... 
To consider persistence from a practical investment perspective, we constructed portfolios 
based on historical top quartile performers, second quartile performers etc... Portfolios 
were now rebalanced quarterly instead of annually, by equally weighting the funds in each 
performance quartile (based on the quartile performance of the prior year). Returns were 
accumulated on the subsequent quarter of "unseen" data. 
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Figure 6.12: Cumulative returns from annual rebalancing of portfolios in the same 
performance quartile 
Figure 6.12 shows the results of investing in these quarterly rebalanced portfolios based 
on the historical performance quartiles of their component funds. The results are 
reasonably consistent with the annual rebalancing of Section 6.2.4.1. Clearly, the first 
quartile funds performed best, with second quartile funds performing marginally better 
than the benchmark. Third quartile funds according were placed third in terms of 
performance over the period, with 4th quartile funds performing worst. This result once 
again confirms persistence of fund performance, with an even stronger corroboration for 
151 quartile performers using quarterly assessment periods. 
6.2.5. Conclusion 
Contrary to popular local belief the picture that has now emerged in ,this study points to 
persistence of fund performance, rather than lack of it. In 5 out of the 6 consecutive years 
analysed we found positive correlation between the ranked performance of the funds (and 
in 3 of them the results were statistically significant at the 10% level). This latest evidence 
seems to be primarily driven by the conSistently superior performance of some top 
performers (rather than persistent poor performers). It seems that there are managers 
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who have significant skill, to the extent that they have systematically been able to 
outperform their peers. 
As an exercise to assess the practical advantages of persistence of fund performance, we 
considered the impact of investing in historical top quartile performers, second quartile 
performers etc., rebalancing annually, and accumulating returns during the subsequent 
year of "unseen" performance data. The results are indeed surprising and compelling. 
Contrary to popular local belief, selecting historical top quartile performers yielded vastly 
superior performance results to a wide range of alternate combinations. The relevance of 
the persistence result to multi-managers is that there exists evidence that selecting top 
performing funds is a superior strategy, and interestingly, the second best strategy was 
that of selecting a passive peergroup of funds. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
PRACTITIONERS 
The aim of this thesis was to provide the practitioner with some applications of quantitative 
techniques in the area of asset management. 
The first significant contribution in the thesis was in the area of portfolio optimisation -
specifically on the demonstration of the Black and Litterman (1992) technique of 
quantitative portfolio design based on managers' views in the local South African context. 
This practical application of the traditional Markowitz optimisation was shown to be useful 
to practitioners, as the resultant optimal portfolios was not accompanied by the 
characteristic problems of input sensitivity and portfolio concentration. The most 
encouraging result found however was that manager views are incorporated into the 
optimisation process so that investment weights tilt away from a benchmark in an intuitive 
and practical way. This procedure of applying the Black and Litterman adjustment to the 
return inputs is thus recommended for practitioners when endeavouring to optimise active 
portfolios. 
The topical areas of benchmarking were also reviewed, with specific emphasis placed on 
the selection and construction of benchmarks for various client requirements. Here the 
aim was to demonstrate the use of graphical aids to better understand the basic concepts 
of matching the portfolio risks to that of the benchmark, as well as constructing an 
outperformance benchmark. These contributions serve primarily as useful aids for 
trustees. Two other topics of benchmarking were considered, with primary contributions 
being to demonstrate optimisation techniques in estimating competitor benchmarks, and 
assessing the ability of outperforming benchmarks given various levels of skill and 
aggression. 
Issues in portfOliO risk management for active managers were considered. Given the 
practical difficulty in determining appropriate tracking errors, a bootstrapping technique 
helps with the objective of setting risk mandates to avoid specified underperformance of 
active managers. It was also shown that funds that conSistently perform well use a greater 
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proportion of their active risk on stock selection, and thus this strategy is recommended 
for practitioners. 
Lastly, two studies of mUlti-manager topics were reviewed. It was shown that when 
combining more than 4 standard General Equity managers, this usually results in a 
combined fund having a passive character, falling outside of the ideal active risk range. It 
was also found that there exists evidence of persistence in the Unit Trust industry, and it 
seems to be primarily driven by the conSistently superior performance of some top 
performers. 
Directions for future research ..• 
A direction for future research is possibly applying the Black and Litterman adjustment to 
the estimated covariance matrix. Since this thesis focused on using conditional distribution 
theory to adjust only the expected mean vector, the demonstration of adjusting the 
covariance matrix in an optimisation context is a useful and relevant direction for future 
research. 
Estimating the covariance matrix has also become a relevant area of research for 
practitioners. Given the volatility of financial markets in today's day and age, it would be 
useful for practitioners to model covariance structures for both turbulent and calm periods 
of financial markets. Practitioners could then make asset allocation decisions based on 
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